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1959 P'ebruary 12 OONGRESSIONAL REOORD-SENATE 2033 
SENATOR MIKE MAN~FIELD 
THE COM I NG CRISIS I N GERMANY 
ILLNESS OF SECRE'TARY OF STATE 
DULLES 
Mr. MANSFlELD. Mr. President, be· 
tore I proceed to the remarks which I 
Intend 1.(1 make on the German Illuallon, 
I wish to Bay that I alll deepl.),! dl5tress~ 
by the ne1ll"S of the lJIness or the Secre· 
tary or State. 
Th,e duties ot the Secrelary of State 
are Just about the most uactlng and 
IltrenuoUII in the Government, not ex-
cluding the Presidency, The intellectual 
demands of the Job are enormous. The 
physical demancU are appallln,. For 
years, Secretary Dulles has borne up un-
der them without complaint. Hb starn. 
Ina Bnd durability hllve been little IIhort 
ot Incredible. However,ln the Secrelary, 
as In other men, there 18 a physical limit. 
Hil total personal dedication to the serv-
Ice ot the Nation haa taken Its toll of 
his health. AI one doctor put It, the 
Beeretary 1& worn out, It ls a shame, 
Mr_ PreSident, that the Nation hu re-
No 20&--4 
qull"td $0 mIlCh of oue man, And It Is 
to the Nation" detriment. moreover, that 
he h .. h.d to push hlmKlI beyond the 
limit. 
We t'n m .trord to !0Ie his ~l'\'lers 
.t any time We c.n '!)are them leu! 
.t thl. moment. 6eere"'", Dulle, Is 
needed u never before to eomplel.e the 
vel")' dellc.1.e neeoUaUons on Berlin and 
Germany whleh he had Just becun 10 
• u~plcloully. 
Mr_ Dulles has cI!)lOtile IlI&OClate.l In 
the Del)ll.rtment of State, With aU due 
respect 1.0 them, however, the Secretary 
will be torely mL&secl In the weeiu .head. 
The NaUon n~ his areat experience, 
hi. balance, hi, Itrenath, hll ab1Uty 1.0 
decide. 
I share .·lth the Praldent and the 
Nallon the feellna of dlstreu which the 
Seeretar,', lIIneu brllli', I know the 
Senlte Johu .... ·lth me In .... "hln' Mr, 
Dulles a full recovery and a prompt re-
turn to his key role In the se.n:h for a 
secure peace. 
Mr. SPARK MAN. Mr. President, "'iU 
the 8elUltor from Montana yield? 
Mr. MANSPIELD, I yield. 
Mr. SPARKMAN. I endorse every-
thing that hIlS been hid by the d.l.Uln_ 
aulshe<l Senator from Montana concern-
Ing tlie mneaa of Secretary of Stato 
Dulles and the work which he has b«n 
dOing. r have often man'ded, IS I am 
certain many other persons havc, at his 
stamina. 1 t('Call readlna in the preM 
recently that durin&" the time Mr. Dulles 
hM been Secretary of State, he haa 
tr.\'ele<l more than 500,000 mila, He 
h AIl m.de many lonr Journey" and often 
a fte r ha return, perhaPt "'Ithln a day or 
b'o, he .... ould be 011 on lUIother l()lll: 
trip. 
1 nnt knew Mr Dullrs when he 
Itrved. for • -.hon Urne In Ille Umted 
StaLeS senate, But 1 came to know 
him better .. hen J .... rv~ .. Ith h1m tn 
the Urut.!d NatiON aa a del~ate In 1~50 
and, subsequent t.o Ulat time. for the 
ensuJ.1ljJ 1l months. 
On Sl'pt.embe:r ., 1950, at .bout 12 
o'clock' noon, Pres.ldent Trwnan called 
Mr. Dulles 1.0 Ule White HO\L$I'. Mr . 
Dulle, .t that time ... an L1-,l$tant III 
the D<'part.ment of SI.II.e under the Ull'n 
Sec:re"'l'7 of SLue Acheson. Pruident 
Truman asked l"dr. DuUes on 1.hat day If 
he .·ould be "'Ulloa: to L$IIumc the re-
sponslblllt.y or fonnulaLLna the Japan~ 
Peace Treaty. and In .ettlll, the t,,-o 
Itore or more natlon ..... hlch ""ould be 
part..ie. to the conference 1.0 aaree to 
114 al'nenl l.erm.s. 
If an aMlanml'nt can be lma,lned 
which waa more dtmcult .nd more com· 
plex than that of brlngtna toa:elher lOme 
40 natloNi of the world "'hleh ""cre Ircat· 
Iy concerned about the terlll.$of the Japa-
nese l)C'ace treaty, I cannot conce!\'e of It.. 
But Mr Dulles underl.OOk to do the Job. 
Mr_ Dulles told me later that PresJdent 
Truman a$kl'd him at the time how Ion. 
it .ould takl'_ Mr. Dulle, replied that 
he thoujlht it .-ould take a ynr. Mr. 
Truman thcn .saId, '"I .... 111 alve you one 
year In "hlch to t\nJsh the JOb." 
At that UrnI'I WIl.s the thalnnan of the 
SubcommlUcc on Far En.stf'rI\ Atrllirs of 
the conuntUee on Forl'lan Relations. I 
beeame a mtmber of the committee in 
Jllnuary 19.51. Naturally, I had a. close 
1'I'latlonshlp .1th Mr. Dullts In his ...... ork 
durlna the entire yellr 1951. I 'II'ftlI In 
conrerencc frequently ...... Ith him, because 
Ulls ,,'U a f'lLr ~tern Question. The 
subcommittee and our ll.5I!istanu mct 
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with Mr. Dulles at aU t1J:nes of the day. 
sometimes In the mornln" socneUDlOl at 
lunch. someUmes In the aftemOODi or 
evenlnas. I feel QuiUl certain that dur-
ln' the time the treaty '111'''' belna form-
ulate<!.. the Subeommlttee on Far EMt-
em AIr'irs. Mr. DuliN. and his associ -
ates had probably 100 dllferent meetlnp. 
I bave olLen .aId It was one ot the most 
remarkable Jobs J ever IJ8.W any man per_ 
form. It WN not clUy to brlna: toaether 
the British. on one hand, and the NIl-
tlonaU.t Chlneu, on the other. It wu 
not caa,. to brine: toiether the SOuth., .... t 
AAl ... naUolUI and the central European 
nations. But I'radually Mr. Dullea wove 
• plan under which .11 natiolUl ""ere at 
leut wlillng to attend. conference. 
The conference '\I,'U held In the San 
Francl300 Opera House. It ended. on 
September 8, 1951. JUlIt before we left 
t he Opera House. I laid to Mr. Dulles, 
"Thl.l Is the annlveuary of the day YOU 
lUldertook to do thls work. At what 
t ime of the day did President Truman 
",liIl It to YOU?H Mr. Dullea replied 
th .. t It '11'1.11 at 12 o'clock noon. I looked 
.. t my "' .. tch ... nd, rn .. kll\l .. llowance for 
the difference In time between Wuhll\l-
ton .. Dd C .. lIfornla, I II&ld to him. "You 
llave 8 rnlDUlet to ,p .. re." In other 
",ordll, the time ]acked 8 mlnutH of 
beln' 1 year from the ttme Mr. Dulltt 
b .. d undertaken to do the work. 
Followll\l the conference, former Ben. 
at.Gr Smith. of New Jersey; Mr. Dulles, 
acUng for Mr. Truman and Secretar)' 
of State AchetOn; .. nd 1 vblted it. number 
of the Par Eutern countries. We apent 
aeveral "'eek. In J .. ~n, wort1n& with 
the different rrouPi there In arrlvlna: at 
undentandlngs, ... best we could. and 
workln. on the nlher dltDcult problem 
Involvlnr Natlona.llit China. partlcu. 
larly, and the whole China problem. lUI 
well. 
It was then that I came to admire Mr. 
Dulles. ll\dmlred his tenacity. his power 
of Intellect, and hll 6klll In nt\loUating. 
One of the great services he hal per-
formed as SCCreLliry Of State hlUl been 
In the neld of neloUating between IHr,-
tlOIU which hnd difference. and prob. 
lems .... hlch wel'e m<»t dltDcult to solve. 
I share the feelln"" lI,hlch has been 
expressed by my good frlcnd. tho Senn. 
tor from MonLRna. as to the need for 
Mr. Dulles at present to dcal wllh the 
particula r problem about which the 
senator from MonUlna wlil speak to us 
today. 1 am delllr:hted to know that 
since Mr. Dulles' physical condition II 
luch that his doctou advise his tllklna-
leave and enterlN a hospital. ho hlUl 
acted on that advice. I hope he will 
rcmaln away trom his work for IU much 
time as will be nece."fIlry to result In II. 
complete restoration of his health, 
which 1 am confident wUl take place, 
because I know IOmethlnll: ot the phys_ 
lelll uamlna ot tile man. 
I ... ·Ish him a speedy recovery and a 
rcturn to hl~ ))O;S.iUon u 5e<:retary or 
State Just a.s IIOOn 1\.1 he III ablc to do 10. 
I Iccl certain that his Influence will be 
fclt In the nC1/:otlatlons In the various 
collferences ... 'hlch ""Ul be held In the 
future. I knoll' that Ilia &5llstant.l In 
the Departmcnt or State ""ho hllYe 
worked with him tor so lonll: and 10 well 
will be able to carry 011. 1 am aure they 
wlU IJUppOrt Mr. Dullea, and th .. " ~ 
ntiotlattng ability will be felt 10 the con-
ferences, and will cont.1nue to be heJpful 
even in hLs I.bsenee. 
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. Prealdent. will the 
Senator yield? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. 
Mr. AIKEN. I have been very happJ' 
to hear the expresalona of ,DD<l 11'111 to-
ward Secretary Dulles whlch h .. ve been 
SpOken today. I wish to Join In them. 
I have been a member of the Commit-
tee on Forela:n Relatlona only .. J'eara, 
and have not been IO,CIOllei.J' UIOClated 
with the work of Mr. Dullea M hal Ule 
Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPIoIlKMAN1, 
for Imtance, who hM Just concluded. hLs 
very nne statement. 
I think t ew men 10 pUblic life have 
liven &0 much. of their time durin, 60 
many years of their lives to thl:l tormula.-
tlon and administration of tore Ian ~­
ICY a.s has Secretary Dullea. 1 know the 
Nation Is grateful to him for hi' accom-
pllshmen\.S. I k.now oun II .. blpart.l&an 
a:ratefulneM. also, lUI the Senator from 
Alabama ha.s well exprCllCd. 
I do not luppose that all ot Mr. Dulles' 
plans have materialized &II he boped 
they would. But we must recaU that he 
hu been servlnl as Secretary of State 
and as adviser to t.he secretary of State 
dur10i one of t.he BlOllt critical periodt 
of history, and many of the mOllt dtm· 
cult prob]etn5 the world hae raced have 
coma betore him for IOlut.lon. We have 
seen t.he lO]utlon of lOO\e ,ltuaUOlll 
which were considered vl.rtUa.llJ' uaolu-
ble-for Imunce, the ,Ituatlon 1n 
TrIeste. I know all of us are happJ' to 
learn that there are Pl'OQleCtI of penna-
nent peace and hannonJ' iIi the Island 
or cyprus.. where the TUru and &.lIt:! 
Greeks ha\'e come to an aa:reement. 
I believe t.he whole world 0\0'" a con· 
Iidcrable debt to Mr. Dulles. I wish. to 
JOin my colleagues In hoplna: that Mr. 
Dulles will havc a. ,peedy rcoovery, fol-
lowing his trip to !.he hOllPltal, and 
I500n will again be back at .... ork. E\'en 
though everything may not hne 80ne 
as he hope(! It would, yet 1 know of no 
ono who could have achieved a. ]arQ'e r 
percent ... \~e of succellll than he haa over 
these t.roublt.$Ome y1)11.I"3. 
Mr. MANSflELD. I t.hank tile sena-
tor from Vennont. 
Mr. CARLSON. Mr . P re5ldent. will 
the senator from Montana. yield to me? 
The PRESIDINQ OFFICER.. Does 
the senator trom Montana yield to t.he 
senator from Kansas? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yIeld. 
Mr. CARLSON. I appreciate very 
much t.he opPOrtunl~y to as.soclate III.Y-
lSClf with the remarks of the actina- rna.. 
Jorlty lender IMr. M ... NsPluDl. the sen-
ator from Alabama (Mr. SP ... RKMAff I. lind 
the senator from Vermont IMr. AIKEN), 
10 regard to t.he Secretary of State, Mr, 
Dulles. 
It seems to me tha t at tl\1s time. ""hlch 
seems to be one or our In'ea.test Inter_ 
naUonai 1'11_. our Nlltlon a.nd the 
other nations of t he world can III a.trord 
to sJ)9.I'e tlIe lSCrvices of t.his m05t able -Secretary Dulles h as demonstrated not 
only his ability, but, It seem.s to Ine, a 
peculiar temperament fOr work.lna: In 
th1s lI.eld. t thlnk he ,e\.S that tempera_ 
ment and tl\at bacl::a:round from belna: a 
areat Chr13t1a.n ia.J'rnan. H1s loterests 
art In people. I beUeve that II what ""e 
need. durtna: this period In the world's 
hlstoq. I think that one of our prob. 
lems at the present time Is to lcarn how 
to live with other people. OUr ,enera. 
Uon hal not done 60 well; as a matter 
of fact, we have foua:ht about three wau 
In one ,eneratlon. Somehow, In some 
WIL}', our YOUN people, the comlna: ren-
eratton, must learn how to IIve'wlth other 
people. When we learn to do that, I btl· 
lIeve we shall be able to accomplish 
much In brlnllna: about the peace and 
the economic conditions that all us of 
are praylna and hoplna for . 
I w1IIh for the Secretary of State .. 
most speedy recovery. We need. him. I 
know he will receive the best of care that 
doctors and medical 'kill ca.n proVide. 
So we look. forward to h1a r eturn to 
service. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Sena-
tor from KaIUIII.-
Mr. Prealdent. I uk unanimous con_ 
sent to have printed at thLa pOint In the 
RICORD, u a part or my rerna.rb. a. ra.dio 
COmmenUry by Jack Jurey on February 
10, 19S9, the evenlna: of the announce-
ment of the leave ot abIIence lor t.he See-
retary of State. 
There belna: no objection, the state-
ment Will ordered to be Printed 1D the 
Rl:CORD,1UI follo .... : 
'nil. Ia J.cll: JI.I.A1 1I1th the WI'OP eo"'" 
mUlt for tonllll.t. 
Tha ne_t U1n_ or Secreta.., or Butt 
Dullea abould ea.u.e WI .n to join PrftlldeM 
EtMntLo.-.... In el<tendlnl ~ W1aJIe- to thla 
dedicated otI\claJ who. !!.owen. mUCh One 
ma, <II ........... th h •• ""Ue'_. 1'1 ..... o.II:M 
.., tlrel_l, on beb .... o. tbe UnIt«! Stat ... 
We lonl .... !<Mt tnt.cll: ot the to~ mile. 
loRed b1 Mr D ... L1 ... In hla peripatetic qutn 
tor PUC', or the number ot stopa be h .. 
made. Or the number 01 omcl'la to whom ho 
h .. t ... ked In vll'tu"'l, all quane" ot the 
Ilobe. 
But ... <'10 know thl., tha t John Poo~ 
Dullea Ilnee Ig53 h .. npende<'! hla energies 
and ha.llh at •• «kl_ rate. Rt a lime 0' 
I1le wMn mc;wt ot .... woula bo realgne<l to 
IOttLlnr dO"'" with pipe and .L1ppe..... E>;-
1'«111111 ,Ince hi, ope,..,tion tor c.ncer. he haa 
a l.playll<! In uncommon devotion to dUty. 
Thla new. man . ebllLlI ""rUe ... la.l, that 
alter hIa nnt·to_laat II1n ...... bout with 
dIVtrtlcuLltu •. Mr. Dullea apoloelzed to .. 
nO"1 eonle .. nca tor not having aeen re-
pon, .. lOT & period. of leve .... wed,.. S ... cb .n 'pOl"" ..... not onl, unu .... al In an 
a<'lmlnLlltr.tlon wblch IOmetlm ... ue<m to 
tIIlfe I 1..;II:Rdall1CRI atUtucte to"",r<t ne .... . 
men. but ..... npr_IYe 01 tbe I nn~ It ... " 
ot thl' un".uall, Ilfte<l man. In man.,. u· 
opec" he Ia a t ... better pubJic servant than 
lODle or hi. crltlCa woulel 1I. .. ·e .... belleye. 
8peall:lnl ot c.ltIeo, It _rna an appropriate 
time to mention that many American.. may 
not eomprehena What h .. happened In Ihe 
I .. t dlOCade to the ollke whlcb Mr. Dulles 
holdl. 
POt .. ell Onr .. centu,.., and a hAlt. a See· 
reta.., ot 8u.u ...... tor \lie molt part a 
CabInet al!LcL'" .ub,..,ted on11 to oompara-
tlnl1 minor It .... na. tOT Ihe reaaon Ihat the 
UnlUd 8U.t .. oon.ldered lIMIt (and. w .... 
tor tn. _ part) .. remOle laJaD<l In the 
.... t ..... 01 tnterno.tLonal troublH- In the 
«( .. Ionel periOd .. hen the N .. Uon .... con· 
'ron"'", b1 h .... W __ ld "",,Jtle., It ..... orten 
the Pre-Ident hI_it wbo bore t.b.e brunt: 
Jell'ereon, Madllon, Ll9I.coln. WlLoon. Frink· 
lin Rooa/!velt. 
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The pOIIt·World Wnr U ,ea .. , howe"tr, hue 
.een .... evolution fond. elevation of Ihe 6e<:-
retary ot State', dutlH, to the poInt where 
this alnlle man, ",helhe. he be Of(lrle Mu_ 
,haLL, Dean ""tiMOn, or Dulle., ha. da,.to_ 
da)' respon,l,bmu. unparaUeled In American 
history, 
The .tuon, ot course, r. Ihll country', re_ 
luctant eme'lence ... a m .... , .. e world power, 
with ,,11 the trial, and trlbulatLont that .ueh 
• IUltUll ImpUe.. ne world IIrUll:lle .·lth 
communr.m, conducted. on multldimell_ 
,Ionllll,,'ell. I. enoulh to .tuln the .trtnlth. 
pMlence, .nd reaourc_ or an" man, .nd 
certainly one whO. like Secretary DuUet, muat 
carry with hIm the burdtII.I or 'dnnc.cl '1' 
d the dem.r.ndl ot "n .cU", Chrr.tr.n 
Klence. 
'e atfI .monl thOll ~ .. ho ~lLe ... thlt, on 
Ion. l.1r Dullea hat ~en ml_taken W, 
• r, tor u.mple. that In lOme t .. pecta 
f..,I.cI to demOIl.ltrate the rHlllene, 
d th.t new clr<:unuunctl demand. 
h thr. crltlei.m doe, not, tor" mo_ 
eny Ihe Intellectual quaUl'lceUon, 
"nsl to hi. leak, 
o crlUelu. Of courte, could be 
I, hr.tory will tell. But the teet 
mur on occulon dOft not dlmlnLlh 
I tor the man h\mtelf, onl .. ho 
r, heu, load Ind.ftc1. 
IUcLam obleu .. the undenl.ble 
bl, moment nt tliltory, .·tth the 
I on the door ot Welt Berlin, 
U" I, Yet, nearl, an India_ 
to hit countr,.. It would be 
rut COnCern mouLd he nnt 
Ih Ind nnt be "bL, to tHume 
e SUI' Doepanmtnt. 
eon'" nd nationll reUON 
ho t SKreta" DuLL" 
k petlUon .nd 'ifiLL be 
uldtr the full ... flaM 
THE COMINO CRISIS IN OERMANY 
Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr.,Presldent. let 
me preface my remarks with this assur~ 
ance to the Senate: I am not an alarmlst. 
I meas~ moet carefully the .. or(\.s I am 
about to speak. In that con\oext. I ex; 
press to the senate my belief that just 
ahead lies the moet critical period ""hlch 
the Unlted Slates will have had to faee 
since the conflict In Korea. 
The crisis. Mr. President. Is comlnl In 
Germany, Specitically, It Is COmine In 
Berlin. Indeed, It may have already 
begun. Por yeau nov.', the ~eds of that 
crlsls have lain dormant. in a divided 
Germany, They haVe been held In 
cheek only by a kind of mutual acqule!~ 
eense. The Western Powers ha\'e not 
wished to disturb the seeming stability In 
Germany. Since the Berlin b]oekl'lde. 
the Soviet Union has not serlous]y 
threatened It. A few years a80. uprls~ 
Ings of Eallt Oermans shook the stability, 
but did not break It. 
Those who have thou8ht at aU about 
the German situation have known for a 
long time that the surface calm 1I .. ould 
not last. The existence of tv.·o German 
authorities In what Is one Germany has 
been, from the end of World War II , a 
makeshln arran8ement. The w estern 
Powers have recognlzed It, The Soviet 
Union ha.s acknowledged It. The Oer-
man leaders know It. 
The key QuellUon has never been, Will 
Germany be unined? The qQestlon has 
long been, When and how "'Ill Germany 
be unltled? Those of us who have urled 
nn InltlQtlvc In Amt'rlcan poliCy with re~ 
SpeCl to Cknnnny have been av.are ot 
this distinction, When I addreSM'd my-
:>elf to thl.~ subjeet In the Senate Ln May 
1958, I had the distinction very much In 
mind Becau~e I did, I tried to deal In 
the s)lt'Clflcs of an American InltJlllu'e, 
In su~~estlng. last May, alternatl\·t's to 
present polley. my thoUJlht was that 
when the Matus QUo lave way, M surely 
It must, the chan!!el! ought at \cast to 
hold prombe at Il'adlng to the .tr('nlrth~ 
enlng of freedom In a pt'aceful Oermany. 
Mr. CHURCH Mr, Presld('nt .'11\ the 
Senator from Montana yield to me? 
Mr. MANSPlELD, Mr, Presldtnt. I 
am delllhted to yield to my dlstil\i'ubhed 
friend from Idaho. 
Mr. CHURCH, I w~h to apoloclte 
for InterrupUnl SO 5()()n the remarkS 
of the senator from Montana, bt'eaule I 
believe that the address he Is d~lIverlns 
will be a mOlt .llnlncant one, But I 
""Ish to ,Iy that, chlraeterlltieally, In 
hl$ openlnl remarlU the senator trom 
Montana has pierced to the nub ot the 
l$$ue. CondlUolll In ~nnany are lolna: 
to ehanle Oermany will not lndt'nnltely 
rem.ln divided alalnst lIMit, Oermany 
",·m not Indennltely eontinue to be lar-
rlltOned by torelln troop~. 
It 5eC'ms to me that thOf,(' who 'l'Iy our 
forelln polley mu~t be InnC'xible ovtr~ 
look the tact that oun 1s not a Itatlc 
world. 
Thert'fore, MT Pres.ldent, I think t.he 
Senator from Melnlana rendl'red us a 
ICrvlee ",·hen. a yt'IT alo. he emphUlud 
the fae\ that conditIOns In Oermany 
would be ehan.lll8. and that ""1' mu~t be 
prepared to tllce up to those chan.ea It 
v.'f! a~ to cope errl'cllvely "!Ih th.m. 
F'lexlblllty In our forelln polley Is a 
mu~t. A steel blade bends. Pla Iron 
breau. • 
I ""15h to thank the Senator from Mon~ 
tana for comins fO",'aro at thIS ~1a.1l"t' 
In the dl'VeloplnlC Berlm erl.~l. v. Lth a 
!I'peech v.hlch • Lll be he]pful In I'h'mg 
I'uldllnce to all of us. to the Pre"'dl'nt. 
and to the 6l'cretary of Statt', In our 
eommoll errort to sol~e that crisiS for 
the benC'nt at the free .'or]d 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank my trlt'nd 
trom IdahO 
Mr. CLARK Mr. PrC";ldent, at thb 
POmt will Ule &nator tram Montanll 
yield briefly to mt'? 
Mr, MANSf'lELD. I am dellll'hted to 
yield. 
Mr. CLARK. Mr Pr.:w.:ldent, we h .... e 
Just'returned to this Chamber from a 
most Impre.<,$lve joint $l'SlIlon wlUI the 
other body. In connection with the cl'le~ 
bmtlon of the lM!th annlver&8ry of the 
birth at Abraham LinCOln. At the joint 
ses.slon, during a brilliant addres., by the 
area.t wrlt.er and poet. carl Sandburl', he 
had occasion to quot.e a sentence from 
Abraham Lincoln, which I believe Is per-
tinent today In connection with the 
IIP]endld addreM which my friend. the 
Senator from Montana, Is maklna on the 
German que.tlon. LIncoln said: 
'I'lle d08m&l or the qUiet po.t\ atfI Inlode-
quite for the llOnn,. Pl'0H1lt. 
I wish to eongl"lltulat.e my fri end, the 
Senator from Montana, tor the tine ad-
dress he I.s making on the German prob~ 
I,~ 
However, I would not be true to my-
self If I did not /"{"KI~ter a .lIltht dl!W'nt 
from solne of the comm"n{4 which ha\'e 
been made with respect to the Secretary 
of State. 
It " unpleMant and unrewardlnl' to 
oy unkind thlna. about a man who I. 
In phY8Lcal paLn, who has .hown areat 
phy",lcal courue, ""ho ls unquesLlon.bly 
a patriot. who Is a min of great dedica-
tion to the public Interest; but I would 
teel untrue to my~('lt It I did not rCj:ISl('r 
on the floor of the Senate a dlsunt to 
tht' ~tatem('nt that he I. Ind\.\pensable 
to the eonduct at our forellm polley In 
the Immediate future. I call Ittention 
to whit I ha~e laid on other OCCIIIQIU 
with rC'!!'peoct to thb matteT . 
I hope that these comment.. will b~ 
teken In good part. and that It will be 
wldentood that I mike them only be-
ea~ I ca.nnot remain silent when It 
mllht be Indlcaud that I .'11 In accord 
"'Ith what has been said. 
I think the ~nator for yieldlnl'. 
Mr, MANSFIELD. I appreciate "'hat 
the dtBt:nlul.hed Senator from Penn-
.ylvanla has Jtat laid I commend him 
tor his honesty and hl.s lntelrlty. Of 
couriloe, I TffOlTl1:r.e that It " not a new 
\'iewpoint on hll ~rt, but that he has 
been eonsi&lcnt In hi. vlev.·, In thls re-
.peet far some Lime. 1 v.·ould point out, 
howe\'er, that the Immediate dallier, as 
I 1ft' It. II the Btrlln and the Qt'rman 
.Huatl"n, NQ one t.now. more about 
thO$C .ltuatlot'll at the present time or 
" betlt'r prePirN to Itad the allie, In 
mt"l'tml th('m thin Is the 6ecrt'tary 
at Statt', On that baals, as v.·e!! u on 
other basis. I ",L.!Ih him well. I ""Ish hIm 
a ~predy 1't<:0~t'1)'. 1 anucl"all!' Ulll~ In 
the not too dLstant future he v.·m «sume 
his dullt~, and ""Ill act. not u hl.s ov.n 
u·ent. but as the a'{ent of the PresLdent 
of the Unltt"d State,. In conductl~ for~ 
elvn po]lcy, 
Mr. CLARK Ob~ioU'ly, I do not .,LVI 
to tnRalle In a colloquy of exll'ndtd du-
ration "'Ilh my colieaKue at thll UrnI'. 
I should like t.o be rt'COrded as \'l'ry 
much hopln.- Ind prayll\Jl: for Mr. Dulles' 
Immediate rt'eO\'C'ry: but I cannot a~ree 
that th('re arf' not In the State Depart-
m ... nt olht'u u ""ell or better Quahnt"d 
than the 5«'retary to carry on the Ger~ 
man nf' ollatLons. I app«elate that this 
Is a IituaLion on v.hlch the diStinf:ulshed 
senator from Montana and I dl~. 
I shan des1!>t trom turthf'f comment on 
thls partLcular phue. 
Mr, MAN:'IFlELD. I shall dC'llllt, a1&o. 
Mr. Presldcnt. I rept'at. In SUf:IC'slLnll", 
]an May, altt'rnnUves to present pOlley, 
my thoUjlht v.IlS that whC'n the status 
QUO Ra\'e ""ay, as ,urely It must. the 
cha\1i:es oUKht at lea.st to hold promiHI 
of leadlna: to the Itrengthenlt\i of frroe-
dom In a pen.ct'fu] Germany. 
We dLd nC'>thlnll', Mr. Prtsldent. We 
took no InIUl'tti\"l'. We "'t'nt on In the 
familiar \·lIeUOUSIll'SS. In the famHlllr pnt-
tt'rns of policy pau('rns devised yC'ar. 
aRb, In another sC'tUnK. und('r anOlher 
administration. We did not face the 
fact that thllt policy wa.s Ildequale to 
maintain n. ~mblan{'e of stability 1n 
OermlUlY only SO lana: as aU dlreeUy con-
Cf'rned ftequll'~ed In the contlnued divl_ 
.Ion of that nation. 
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That Is water under the bridge. We 
did not choose to act in a positive Cash. 
Ion to change the status quo. Now. the 
Russians have chosen to break It. They 
have chosen to make the break at Berlin. 
They have said, in effect. that, after the 
sprit1&' of 1959, the situation wm no 
longer be as it has been in that city. 
They are qull.(! right, Mr. President. 
Things will no longer be the same In Ber-
lin or anywhere In Germany. If there 
Is any certainty. It Is that the situation 
In Germany at the close of 1959 will be 
tar dltlerent from the present situation. 
We are approaching the beglnninll' of 
the end, the beginning of the end of two 
BerHns and of two Germanys. 
The question, as I have already ob-
l'icrved, was never. Would Germany be 
un.Jtled? It was, When and how would 
Germany be unWed? We may now have 
begun to comprehend the when; the 
actual process of unification Is IIItely to 
begin this year. Only one question re-
mains: How Is Gennany to be unified? 
Will It be by conflict. by negotiation, or 
by ~me mixture of the two? That Is 
the question which Is ImpelJlng us and 
the rest of the world toward the coming 
criSiS In Germany, 
CONSTITVTIOI'ML II.UPQNSIIIILlTlU IN THC 
The responslbJlJty for establishing 
binding foreign policies to deal with the 
impending crisis, the coming change in 
Germany, rests with the President and 
his Secretary of State. Let there be no 
doubt on that score. In this bOdy, at home, 
In the executive branch. or abroad. It 
Is not for the Senate to direct the PreSI-
dent In this matter. The President wJ!l 
have to make his own dee!slons. with 
the assistance of the vast resour<:es of 
the executive branch. When he speaks 
officially on Germany. however. he will 
be speaking for aU of us, whether or not 
we agree with what he says. There Is 
no other way under the constitutional 
tiystem of the United States. 
To say that Is not to constrain upon 
the Senate a silence In these matters. 
On the contrary. since we Shall be bound. 
since the people of the United States 
shali be bound. by what the President 
and his Secretary of State do or fail to 
do In the eoming crisis. the obligation ot 
the senate to debate, to diSCUSS. and to 
advise Is real and it is compelling. 
The Senate of the 86th Congress was 
not constituted so that It might Ignore 
pressing domestic Questions. How much 
less then. can we remain silent on the 
ure-and-death matters ot torelgn polley? 
The President and the Secretary ot State 
have given no Indleatlon that they would 
have this body turn Its back on the crisis 
In Germany. On the contrary, I note 
that the Secretary ot State has already 
sought the counsel of the distlngulshed 
ehalrman of the Committee on Foreign 
Relations {Mr. Fm.ORIOHTI. I eommend 
the Secretary for his Initiative. The 
brilliant chairman of the committee has 
much to eontrlbute to the e.evelopment 
ot POllcy for the situation In Oermany. 
It the Senate Is to meet Its responsl_ 
bllltfes. Mr. President, we must tonn, 
through debate and discussion. an under_ 
standing at the Situation as It Is. and as 
It Is evolving In Gennany. We must also 
discern clearly the stakes of the people ot 
the United States and ot freedom In 
that situation. We must advance, fi-
nally. Ideas for consideration In formu-
lating the foreign poliCies which are to 
safeguard the vital Inkrests of our 
people. 
These are the thoughts which have Jed 
me to these remarks on the coming crisis 
In Oermany. I make them In the spirit 
of responsible Democratic cooperation 
with a Republican administration In a 
matter of vlt.al eoncern to all the people 
of the United States. 
TWO (;"""'A'" AUTlloalTln '''' om: cu...,.",y 
Let me begin by exploring the signifi-
cant realities In Germany, as I see them. 
The basic nallty, Mr. PreSident, Is that 
there are two political authorities In one 
Oennany. 1:hat Is a contradiction 
which cannot and wm not stand.. There 
Is one Germany. And there are com-
pelling historic and practical reasoM 
which require that the unity of that na-
tion begin to emerge without delay It 
there Is to be peace In Europe and In the 
world, 
I stress the point, Mr. President. that 
when we speak of the two Germanlea 
we are reRlly speaking not of two nations 
but of two political authorities. Each of 
these authorities presumes that It Is the 
wave of the future In ali Oermany. Each 
seeks to draw the whole of the German 
people Into Its orbit. 
To be sure, there are profound dUTer_ 
ences between the West Oerman govern-
ment In Bonn and the East German 
Communist regime In Pankow. The 
Bonn f!:overnment Is based upon prin_ 
ciples and practices of democracy whleh 
are eonsonant with those of other west-
ern nations and are expressly supported 
by the inhabitants of West Germany. 
The Pankow regime exists by the meth-
ods or authorltarianltm which come from 
the East. Its source of authority lies In 
the will to power of those who wield the 
authority and the acquiescence-how -
ever 6ullen-of the repressed people ot 
East Gennany. Its sunlvai depends. to 
a far greater degree than anything we 
know In the Western democraeies. on 
miUtary and police power-Its own and 
the SOviet Unlon·s. 
The West German democratic govern_ 
ment exists. It is there. at Bonn. and 
the Communists are not gOing to wish It 
al',ay or subvert It away. It Is gOing to 
stay as long as the people In that zone 
sustain it and as long as the Western 
nntions remain eommitted to Its prole(:_ 
tion against ml\ltary aggression from the 
East. We cannot Ignore the fact, how-
ever. that the East German regime also 
exists. It Is there at Pankow. and Ger-
man communists run It. even though 
Russians may pull the strings tram be-
hind th.e curtain. Unfortunately. I see 
no evidence that the Western nations are 
going to wish away or subvert away that 
East Gennan political authority In the 
practicable future. 
If neither side ean be ..... I~he<l away, or 
6ubverted away, how then Is the division 
ot Germany going to be made to dis-
appear? How I~ a unified Gennany. 
this essential Oermany, this Inevitable 
Germany. going to emerge? There was 
a tlmc, perhaps, when It might have been 
reasonable to hope that the RUSSians and 
German Communists would soon find It 
too coolly to maintain their control in 
ERst Oermany. For years we have 
waited for this promised development. 
We have waited for the RUSSians and 
their campfollowcrs to Cold their tents 
and steal away. 
What we must ask ourselves now Is 
whether there Is any rea'istic basis for 
hoping that this development wUJ come 
about In the practicaNe future? I re-
gret to say that such pubUc Indications as 
there are suggest that the Pankow re-
gime. with Soviet support, Is consolidat-
Ing Its position. that Its authoritarian 
hold on East Germany Is. It anything. 
more secure today than It wa.s a few 
years ago. 
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the 
Senator yield for a question? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. 
Mr. LAUSCHE. With respect to the 
last thought expressed, the Senator from 
Montana has stated that the authori_ 
tarian hold on East Germany Is now 
greater than It was before. Will the 
Senator deal a little more In-detaU with 
that, and state whether the hold Is the 
result of the power of the Communists, 
or whether It Is the will ot the people that 
they be held by the Communlsts? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I should be de-
lighted to try to answer my distinguished 
friend from Ohio. I can say, ot course. 
without equivocation that the present 
GtatU5 Is not the desire or the wUJ of the 
people. The souree of my statement Is 
the US. News & World Report, the Issue 
of February 13. 1959. 
I read from page 67. at the bottom: 
£~st O ermany', Communist government 
h .. J"o< pubUohcd oll'lelnl IIgu.u On 1 •• 
pinnn~d upenCl iturt8 for 1959. 
Before I read further I wish to say 
thRt aU the Information I have In my 
presentation has appeared In the publiC 
print. There Is nothing secret or offiCial 
about what I am saying. and It simply 
represents one Senator·s opinion as to 
whnt I think Is the most dimeult and 
dangerous question of today. 
I continue with the quotation from 
the U.S. News & World Report: 
We,t Ge,man ftnancl~1 upena. looking 
Into the Red.· ftguru. In tbe budget and 
out of It. made II. 't.nrUlng dl .eo,·ery. 
M!IIlRry .pendlng by tile Ea$~ German 
Reds In 1959 Is to be 30 pereent higher than 
mlllt.nry '~"dlng plnnned by Wen Germ~ny. 
Yet the Red. roy Ula~ Wc. ~ Germany La 
threatening tbe peace or the world. 
That Is what I mean when I say that 
the Pankow regi me Is more secure. not 
In a political sense but in a military 
sense. They have been strengthening 
themselves on a military and paramili-
tary basis. Of eourse. the 22 to 28 Soviet 
divisions are stili In East Germany. 
Mr. LAUSCHE. I agree with the Sen-
ator. My IneLination would be to be-
lieve that the people ot East Gennany. 
lf they had the opportunity, would un-
shRckle themselves ot the hold which 
the Soviet has upon them. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator Is ab_ 
solutely correct. I have been told that 
the figure would run a~ high as 95 to 96 
percent or Ule East Germans who, If 
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''1ey had the opportunity to vote. would 
vote against the present Ulbricht regime. 
Mr. LAUSCHE. But the fact Is that 
the SOviets and those of East Berlin who 
n~ree with the Soviets are applying con-
stantly heavier preSliure In the develop-
ml'nt of the mll!tary? 
~il.:' MANSFIELD. The Senator is 
Yl. cc~. 
Mr. LAUSCHE. r thank the Senator 
very much. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. PreSident. It Is 
all very well to hope. as a general prin-
ciple. for the disappearance of totaU-
tarlanlsm. We have held t!'lat principle 
for decades. but we have also had to 
live In a world which has contained since 
Its beginning and stll! contains many 
totalltarlnn regimes. 
No. Mr. PreSident. a valid policy on 
Germany. now. must be built on more 
than the hope of the eventual disappear-
ance of German total!tarlanlsm. It can 
only be bullt on the premise that Oer-
mnny. in one wny or nnother. Is going to 
unify and It Is going to begin to unify 
soon. Further. it cnn only be bulle on 
the permlse that that unity in Germany. 
If it Is to come In peace. Is Ukely to fall 
short of the ultimate goals set for It by 
both the Communist nations and the fr~ 
natlons--the goal. on the one hand, of a 
Communist totalitarian Germany. and 
the goal. on tne othcr. of a fully repre-
sentative democracy In all Germany. 
Until a few months ago there might 
have been a possibility of evading that 
reality for a while longer by assuming 
that the status QUO of division In Ger-
mnny might gO on Indefinitely. But the 
prospect of evasion b now narrowing 
rapidly In the wnke of Mr. Khrushchev's 
announcement of the coming SOviet 
withdrawal from Berlin. The blunt fact 
Is thllt soon either negotlaUons leading 
to German unlfienUon in peace shall be-
gin In earl'lest or there shall begin in 
earnest the use of for<;e to that end. 
II!CII1.lN-T ... , CORI 0"' T"~ CONINe COIISIS 
This brings me to a se<:ond matter 
tI:hlch we must explore. Mr. President. if 
we are to see our way clearly In the im-
pending crisis. Thnt is the question o[ 
Berlin. It Is lit Bcrlln. divided Berlin. 
and along the westerli routcs or Recess to 
the city. that the first Indlcatlol1li ot the 
conflict leading to war or the success 
of negotiations leading to stable peace 
are likely to appear In the coming 
months. 
I shall not take the time of the Senate 
to review the historic Circumstances sur-
rounding the present dlmcultles of the 
western position in BerHn. It Is Simple 
enough to find fault with what was done 
or not done by political and military 
leaders years ago. It Is as easy. £IS it Is 
pOmpous. to pass angry judgments on 
others. with the prop of hindSight. That 
process will serve riO useful purpose in 
this situation. 
Nor shalll tnke the time of the Senate 
to review the legal status of our pOSition 
In Berlin. Some may find solace for our 
dUllculties in legalism. Even the Rus-
sians sought justification for their ac-
tions in it. But legalism Is as best a 
dubiOUS wsy to deal with an explosive 
situation. when there are. liS there £Ire In 
this s.ltuatlon. two opposing judgcs, two 
opposing judgments. and two opposing 
instruments: of mass destruction for 
enforcing the judgments. 
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. Prooldent. wlll 
the Senllt.or yield? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. J yield. 
Mr. LAUSCHE. I wish the Senator 
from Montana would discuss In R little 
greater detail the clement of legalism 
being introduced. I hnve my own un-
derstanding of It. J think we arc advo-
cating the proposition that there are 
certain legal obligations rooted In ngree-
ments which we have made In the PIIst. 
and that In making our demnnds we In-
s.lst upon adherence to those obligations. 
Does the Senator mind discussing th~t 
Question? 
Mr. MANSf1ELD. The Senator from 
Ohio Is correct. Refcrences have been 
made to the agreements made at pots-
dam relative to the occuPlltlon of Derlln. 
References have been mnde to tile 
agreement entered Into by Gen. Lucius 
Clay. at that time commander of OUl" 
forces In Oennnny. with the Soviet au-
thorities. by mearus of whiCh we were 
guaranteed b~' thc Soviet authorities ac-
cess by rail. by rondo and by air, from 
the western zones in Germany Into the 
western soctors of Berlin. 
Then. as [ recaU-and T believe the 
Senator ""Ill corrobomte me on thJ.s.-
~ome sort of ngrecment was madc by 
Mr. Phillip Jessup and a Russian repre-
sentatJve whose name [ cannot recall 
at the moment. Which aRreement Ma}'or 
Willy Brnndt brought to our Mtentlon 
at the luncheon held In the Foreign 
Relations committee room the other 
day. If I remember correctly. he stated 
that out of these Jessup-RUSlIll1n con-
sultations • and agreements. which 
brought an end to the need for the 
allied airlift Int.o BcrJln. also came an 
B{fI'CCment that we be allowed contlnUed 
Rccess. He sugflested that we lOOk Into 
the agreement to which he refcrred ns 
the agreement of 1949. Unfortunately 
I have not had an opportunity to do so 
yet. 
But there nrc thesc ngreements, or al-
leged agreements. which give us the 
right to gO In and to mnlntaln Recess 
between the western zones nnd the west 
sector of Berlin. 
The Russlnns predicate lhelr claims 
on similar agreements. which thcy say 
were made at Potsdnm and elsewhere. 
Mr. LAUSCHE. It Is the position of 
the Senator from Montan.'l., tllen. that 
the problem Is more involved and fliT 
graver In Its posslblc consequences to 
world peace thnn mere adherence to 
those agreements would justify. We 
must gO beyond that. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator Is 
nbsolutely correct. because In my opin-
Ion the pOtentials involved In this situ-
ation are terrible llnd tremendous. 
Mr. LAUSCHI:':. I thank the $Cnator. 
Mr. MANSf1ELD. It does not much 
matter now how wc got to Berlin. or 
why the RUSSians have no legal right 1.0 
ask us to leave. What docs mnUcr. Mr. 
President. is why we need to stay In Ber-
lin. lIS stay there -we must. We lice, 
bluntly. In a highly difficult and danger-
ous position In Berlln. Oreat sacrl1lces 
may be entnlled In remaining. We had 
better understand clearly now tile ~Ig_ 
nlficance of maintaining our position 
there. We had better understand now 
what Is vita! and what Is not vital In that 
poSition to the people of the Unlt.l-d 
States and to fr~dom. 
The administration has responded to 
the Rus.lan prOpOSals on Berlln by re-
Iterating a long-stnndlng view of the Na-
tion It has said. as the DemocratJc ad -
mlnlstrntion before It said. that we will 
not be drl\'en from the city. The posi_ 
tion of this Government. to stand firm In 
Berlin. has been endorsed by the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. It Is sup_ 
ported by Democrats and Republicans 
alike In the Senate. 
It Is a sound position. Only It Is not 
enough. It Is not enough to say. Mr. 
PreSident. that we £Ire standing fast In 
Berlin. That Is a slogan. not a policy. 
Nor Is It enough, Mr. President. to stand 
fast merely to demonstrate OUI' deter-
mination to maintain our legal intel'pre-
tMlon of the situation as against the 
Soviet Union's. 
Nor Is it enough to say that we !tand 
taU In Berlln so that we may continue 
to demonstrate In the heart of Commu-
nist Germany the matel'ial superiorln' of 
f~eedom or tree enterprise ovcr Commu-
nist colle<:tJvlsm. To be sure. there Is II 
striking contrast between West Berlin 
and East Berlin, but I doubt very much 
that the people of the United States will 
countenance the ~acriftce of a single hu-
mnn Ilte for the purposes of propagan-
distic demonstrations in Berlin. And 
before this year Is out many lives may 
hnve been spent In BerUn. 
No. Mr. PreSident. It Is not for rea. 
sons of legalism or propaganda that we 
stand fast In Berlin. 'The Western na-
lions Rre In Berlln because Berlin be_ 
longs neither to East Germany nOr w ... ~t 
Germany: It belongs to all the German 
people. We are In Berlin be<:ause some 
Germans may now look to Bonn and 
others to Pankow for leadership. but all 
Germans will soon lOOk to BerUn. We 
lire In Berlin to see to it that when that 
city Is once alrnln the capll.a.1 of all Ger_ 
mnny. lIS It surely will be. Ole concept 
of freedom In peace wll! not be absent 
from the scene. If that concept were to 
dlsapllear from Berlin. the cltndel of 
German natlonal!sm. sooner or IMer It 
would disappear from £Ill Oermany. 
Then. sooner or Inter. the torch would be 
let In Gelmany. whether by Germall 
hands or some others. to set Europe and 
the world afiame once IIgaln. '1111\t torch 
was lit twice In Berlin In the past. and 
twice th.e world has paid nn enormous 
human price. To see that !t is not lit 
again Is In the essential. the vltnl inter_ 
est of this generation and future genera-
tions of the peoplc of the United States. 
TIlRt. Mr. President. Is the reason 
which beyond all others. justifies the 
taking of the great risks which we mal' 
soon be called upOn to take at Berlin and 
along the westel"ll routes to the city. 
We are in Berlin in order to get out. but 
to get out Only on condition that the 
German politicnl forces which stand for 
freedom In peace have a sure footing 
and eQunl chance to sun'ive and to grow 
01\ their merits In the future capitlll of 
nU Germany. 
I suppOrt fully the poSitioll of this ad_ 
ministration on thc ncccsstly of standing 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 22, Box 75, Folder 8, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
2038 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE February 12 
fa~t In Berlin. I question, hov.'ever, the 
adequacy with which we have related. 
tha~ poslUon to the chanalna situation In 
Germany. I question a poUey which 
provides that not ollly do we stand fru;t In 
BCl'Un, but nlso Implores or demands that 
the RmsJans stand fast. Aller years of 
try!n;: to get the RUSSians out of the In· 
numerable places Into which they 
SWRwled after World War II , It Is Indeed 
strange to hear that we Dre Insisting that 
the Russlnns must not. Indeed. cannot. 
leave B~rlin, That Is a most peculiar 
pos!tlon to u)' the leMt; and the Rus-
sians obviously hfIVC no \ntcllUOll of 
obliging us by remalnln!:. 
It Is clear whal 15 a foot there. In II 
few months hence. the Russians will 
leave East Berlln despite our demands or 
urgings to the contrary. East Bt'rlin will 
then be. once Rgnln. R Oerman city-
Communist, to be sure-but nevertheless 
Germnn, By conU'nst, West Berlin wi\! 
retain the nll)X!arance it now has, the 
appcal"llnCe of a Western enclnve in the 
heart of Germnny, for there are thou· 
sands of All!ed offiCialS and military per-
sonnel In Ule arcn. The contrast will not 
be lost on German nntlonallsts In East 
or West Germany. 
Further, Mr. President, If we are to 
hold this encl::we without strugsle, It WIll 
be at the sufferance of the Ean German 
Communist authorities, H they do not 
choose to accommodatc us, then we shall 
In all probability ha\·e to fil:'ht our way 
through to Berlln. not asalnst RUSSians, 
but allalnst Germnn~. Evcn tr this 
course does not le:ld to a sreat conftict, 
the repercuSSionS In Germany .... m be 
profound. Amon": Germans. as flmong 
others. blood rna,' pro\'e thicker than 
ldeol()fl:les, 
As 1 said. there cnn be no Qunrrel with 
the need to stand fast In BcrHn. I do 
Qucstlon, however, a policy whiCh does 
not anticipate the developments 110 hich I 
have just outl!ned and faUs to take steps 
to mitigate thcm. 
I Question, too, n policy which presumes 
as our poUcy d()('s thflt the Great Powers 
of World War II-the Soviet Union, the 
United K ingdom, F'rnnce, and the United 
State5--Cnn brim: about German unifica-
tion. 'TIlerI' may hnve been a time when 
such a course was I>ossibie. If It ever 
e'(lsted, however. It IIoas ycors aso wheo 
Germany lay devastnlC'C! and prostrate. 
It 11."1\11 years IlSo. III the freshneS!l of the 
common ~acriflce~ of WOlid War II nnd In 
the meuure of mutual respeet and toler . 
ance II."hlch these ~l\crmces engendered. 
Those years are gOne. The time Is nOt 
t oday. Today, tllere Is Httle re~peet be· 
tween this Nallon and the SovIet UnIon 
exeell! the fearful re~peet .... hlch the mil . 
Itary polloer of the one may generate In 
the other. Today, Germany Is neither 
devastated nor prostrate; It h as become 
once aSaln the most d~'lIam!c nallon In 
Wes\('rn Europe. 
No, Mr Pre~ldent, the eulwhlJe Ames. 
the divided Allin of World War 11. are 
not In a J)OOltlon lO ordain a unIficatIon 
In peace fOl" a revitallled Germany. At 
most, they may be able to contribute to 
thflt unificatIon by rethinking theIr own 
security needs In anllclpation of Its In-
evitable development. At most. they 
may be able to contribute to unification 
by exerclsins such Infiuence as they may 
possess to encourage the Germans them_ 
6Clves to reach a reasonable procedure 
on unifieation alld by sanetlonlng that 
procedure If It Is sound. It 1.$ the Ger-
mans. themselves, however, who 11."111 
make the deelsl\·e declslons on unifica_ 
tion, It they are to be made In peace. 
noEl!: ALL'''EUUN ELECrIQN' 
F urther, Mr. President, I Question, In 
present cireum<l:mecs, a poliCy II."hlch 
presumes lO lead to the lleaceful unifica-
tion of Germany solely en the basis of 
free. all-German elections. I say now 
What 1 said last Mayan this point, only 
With more cml.l::lsi~. E,·ents have mo\'ed 
a long way since this pollcy was devised 
and tile bell no lon:l"cr has a n alto;:clher 
rccognlzab:c sound when It Is nmg over 
and over again In !III' same faslllon. A 
G~lman p~lJtienl authol'lty has emerged 
In the West. Another polJUcal structure 
has appeared In the East whlch 1.$ 
manned by Germans, even If It 1$ nOt 
directed by them. Whatever we may 
think of this structure, there Is no re-
liable IndlC:ltion that It Is solng to Ita 
all'(lY peacefully, of it.s own accord, 
There are now military find para-
m!litary German forces In both East and 
West Germany. How are these fOlces to 
be intesrated In peace? ls thl$ a prob-
lem that can be SOh'ed by free, an-
German elcctlons, at least without exten· 
slve preparations by lhe G~rmans who 
omcer these opposlnS forces? 
There are difTering economic and social 
structures functioning In Western and 
E,'l.l;tern Germany. How arc the$(' struc-
tures to be fused In p('ace~ Can they 
be hnrmonized by free, an-German elec-
tIons, at least voithout cxtel\.';lve prepara-
tions by those Gcrmans who operate 
them? 
I cite these problems as examl)les. 
There are no doubt others of a s;mllar 
nature A policy wh:ch advances no 
thou!>ht on how they are to be met does 
1I0t be{:in to meet the realities of the 
German sltu(ltion. If the Ilnlflcation of 
Germany h essential and Inevitable and 
If It is nclther our re5pollSlbll!ty liar In 
the interest of this Nation to seck that 
unity by force, th.:on I submit thnta J>ollcy 
which merely clln"s to an unrealizable 
s\o{:an or free a ll-Gcnnan elections, 
which does not punue German unifica-
tion by other means, I~ 110 policy at all. 
It Is a straitjacket. It Is an excuse for 
Immobility. It may well lead down the 
bUnd alley of an unnecessary eonf\lc' 
or disastrous dIplomatic retreat. 
Mr. LAUSCIIE. Mr. President, 110\11 
the Senator yield? 
Mr, !>IAN~FIELD I yield. 
Mr. LAUSCHE, I take It, from what 
the Senator hflS stated. that the eflorts 
lO procure an overall cleetion of citll.ens 
of Elst and We.~t Germany have thus 
for proved to be futile. 
Mr. MANSFIELD, The Senator Is 
corte(:t. 
Mr. LAUSCHE. TIll' East Cermans 
v,·m not con<ent to have an election un-
der which their )X!ople can Ill\·e expres_ 
sion to the type of govcrnment they 
"'."ant, Based upon the fact thnt that 
obJecti\·e Is an unreallzoble objective, an 
overall frcc election, the SenMor from 
Montana sugcest.s that other means 
should be explored to procure a solution 
of the problem, I wish the Senator 
",'auld comment on that pOint. 
Mr. MANSFII:LD. I believe that the 
J)OOltion of the Western Powers on the 
Question of all-German elections is one 
which stands no possibility In the imme_ 
diate future, and p~rhaps In the Indefi-
nite future, of achieving any degree of 
success, Therefore we should try to 
work out oth~r means. 
As I Shall Indicate In the course of 
my speeeh. there a re contacts In exist_ 
ence between the East G erma n Govern-
ment and the West German Govern-
ment. These contacts arc made on an 
Interzonal baSis, and are tied up with 
commcrclal Intercourse and trade com-
mltment.s. I would hope that In con-
sidering the Idea of elections, we might 
be able to explore, perhaps, Ideas other 
!.han all-German elections, even though 
they are the most desi rable, and I should 
like to see them come to pass, and we 
ml!lht try lO brenk It down-and the 
sooner the better-so that the East Ger-
mans could expre~s themselves at the 
polls, perhaps Just In East Germany. 
and deClare to the world where they 
want to go, In that way they might set 
out from under the yoke the UlbriCht 
aovcrnment. whiCh is exercising despotic 
and complete control over 11 m illion 
Germans In East Germany. 
Mr, LAUSCliE. The Senator from 
Monl.ana elariftCl my mind on the sub-
Ject. In other words. all of us want a 
free electJon under IIohlch the people 
!.h~m~el\'es would decide the type of gO\· -
ernment they de<lre lO ha \·e. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Absolutely. 
Mr, LAUSCHE. However, e\·ery cr· 
fort In that direction has been rebulYed, 
and It Is therefore necessary to find other 
means of \.r}'inJ! to reach a n agreement. 
Mr. MANSF.ELD. T hat Is the idea. 
The Senator Is correct. Every elYort to 
achieve an all-German electlon has 
failed because of the Insistent and do::: -
matie "nyet" nr the S)viet Union. 
Mr, SPARKMAN, Mr. President, will 
the Senntor yield? 
Mr MANSFIELD. I yield. 
Mr. SPARK MAN, Do I understand 
correctly the position of the Senator 
from Montana to be that, while lIe ad· 
hues to what we have advocated so 
long, Ulat Is, free elections for all of 
G;,:rmnny, and the Idea of a unified Ger_ 
mnny, he recognizes the I'ery practlcal 
dltlleulty of having that under present 
condltfons? Therefore he says that per· 
Imps we oUf.ht to make ourselves more 
flexible and 5t:!.rt exploring some other 
.... ay, and thlt there mll:ht be held a 
st'parate election III East Germany ,d 
a st'parate election In West Germ"nr, 
and thus perhaps there could be a~rce­
ment u[>on some kind of independent 
I:O\·ernment In each of the t ..... o areas. 
with the Idea that eventually, as he sa~·s. 
because blood Is thicker than water, with 
tenmwork lIle two tempora~y Germanys 
wl1\ combine Ihemse!l'es Into or.e Q\·erall 
united Cermany some time in the futUre, 
even thouRh we know not how far in 
the future. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. The purpose of my 
speech todny Is to suggest, n'spectfuUy 
and construellvely, some pooslble altern-
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nUve which may be of vnluo to the De_ 
partment of State, or out of which may 
come ideas which would be worthwhile 
toward the bringing about of a solution 
to this most dlfllcult problem. 
Mr. SPARKMAN. I should like to 
propound II. Question to the Senator from 
Montana. He spoke about tlle rigidity 
of our posltlon In the past, Undoubtedly 
It has been rather rigid. so rigid that 
perhaps our country, as well as R great 
part of the world, was mthor shocked 
recently when Secretary Dulles suggested 
there might be more tle:db!Uty thnn we 
have given to the Iden. fmd whe!;! he 
suggested there might be methods other 
than free elections for the solutlon of 
the problem. Is It not true. and would 
not the Senator agree with me in thl!. 
that perhaps we have oversimplified the 
matter in assuming that a reuniflcation 
could be easily brought about betweeu 
the two Germanys? 
I may say that about 3 years ago I had 
the pleasure of attending an Interna-
tional conference at Ga.nnlsch In Ger-
many. The conference was made up of 
people from all the NATO countries, rep-
resentatives of governments, of'ftcials, 
business people, economists, members of 
Parliament. and so on, and one of the 
German Ministers with whom I had Quite 
a long talk made the point to me. the 
first time I had ever heard it mentioned, 
that reunification Is not a simple mat,.. 
ter. As has been pointed out by the 
Senntor from Montana. It might have 
beeu a relatively simple matter several 
years ago, right after the war. But 
since that time the two Germanles have 
grown away from the condition;,; which 
the Senator has so well described In his 
speech. They have grown away from 
some of the Incentives Which might have 
pUShed them together. 
Furthermore. dilferent enactmcnts 
have taken place. FQr Instance. the 
Minister ot the Bonn government said 
to me, "Thls may sound stronge, com-
Ing from me, but East Germany hM a 
social security system which in many 
respects Is better than ours:' 
Mr. MANSFIELD. It also antedates 
our own. 
Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes. Although I 
was speaking of the social security of 
West Germany, It Is also true that theirs 
antedates ours. too. 
East Germany has a system which Is 
In many respects better than that In 
West Germauy. so the ElIl!t Germans 
could not be IIl!ked to (lIve UP their SYS-
tem of social security. workmen'S com-
pensation, and land reform. 
The &mator from Montana. I believe, 
heard me ask the mayor of West Berlin 
the other day' that very Q4est!on, and he 
heard the mayor's comments. to the cr-
fect that to bring the two Germanlell 
together. whenever It may be done, wm 
necessitate the resolving of diffcrences 
and the makln!> of allowances between 
the two govcmments. As I understand, 
that is exactly what the Senator'is talk-
Ing about. He Is speaking of the neces-
&lty on the part of those concerned to 
be ready to consider and to negotiate 
with reference to all the changCl; which 
have taken place th~oughout the years.. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is cor~ 
recto 
Mr. SPARKMAN. I commend the 
Senator from Montana for making this 
very able speech and call1ng to our atten-
tion a matter which Is not only of tre-
mendous Importance but also ot sreat 
timeliness. After all. the ultimatum wtH 
expire on May 28, which Is not rar olt. 
]t has been suggested since the ulti-
matum was made that perhaps there will 
not be absolute adherence to that exact 
date. Nel·enheless. we are approachinK 
the day when Ru.s.o;la will leave Bet·lIn. 
I think the Senator Is correct In sayinK 
that Russia will lea I'e. and that the 
United States will be placed In a railler 
ridiCUlOUS position If we try to keep Rus-
sia there, when. as a matter of fact. we 
hal'e been saying to the world for many 
years that she should set out of the 
different countries whiCh she occupies. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. As a matter of 
fact. the Soviet Union hall already with-
drawn some of I~ troops and a conllld-
erable number of the dependen~ of those 
troops. So It does not appear that RUll-
sia was fooling· when It delivered I~ ulti-
matum. I hope that the United States 
will do, all I feel certain we arc doing, 
everything possible to develop alterna-
tives and to consider way. and means 
to meet the situation. If and when It 
arises, when the deadline occurs. 113 the 
Senator from Alabama has polntcd out, 
on May 27. 
Mr. SPARKMAN. I think the Scnator 
from Montana Is exactly correct. Cer-
tainly we mould be exploring all the 
IIlternllth·es. I thlnk the Senator will 
agree with me that we ought not simply. 
easily, and Quickly reject any proposal 
which Is made, but lImt we should be 
willing to let the world know that we are 
willing to sit dovm and negotiate con-
cerning every proposal which may come 
from either side. 
Mr. MANSF'lELD. Ye~. I hope both 
the Sovlct Union and tile Unltcd Stntes 
wl1l get away from the au~omatie re-
actions of the proposals which one coun-
try makes to the other. Usually the 
answer Is an au'tomatle ··No." Once In 
a while a "maybe" or a "perhaps" and 
occaslona~ly a "yes" would be useful. t 
think In that "'(a)' we might begin. at 
least on the mllrglnal level. to do away 
with some of the dlffercnces. Ir we can 
do that. perhaps we can work our way 
upward to an eventual solution of the 
bigger problems. 
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will 
the SelUltor yield? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. 
Mr. LAUSCHE. The other day, in thc 
talk with t.he mayor ot West Berlin. I 
V''1S greatly encouraged by his rcason-
allieness in wanting to explore evcry 
avenue which might lead us out of dark.-
ness into the light and to all a.s.sured 
peace for those people. May I ask the 
senator from Montana If he hill! given 
any consideration to the abl1lty of tile 
Soviet Union. after It has once with_ 
drawn Its troops. to jump in again be-
cause of Its closeness to this area of 
Eas~ Berlin? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I have. Indeed. If 
the senator will bear with me. I 511all 
discuss that subject brietly when I come 
to the ninth point in my recomtllenda~ 
UO~ 
Mr. LAUSCHE. I thank the Senator 
from Montana. 
• .,L'TUY W'THOK.WAL IN cnM.NY AI<O 
CENTRAL "<iliOn 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Finally, Mr. Presi-
dent, I Question a policy which appears 
to resard Ill! sacrosanct present mllltnr), 
arrangements In Germany and Central 
Europe. I can understand. I can accept, 
I can support the concept that Western 
Germany's ties with Western Europe are 
essential to the peace of Eurol)C and they 
must not be broken. Within that con~ 
cept, however, I callnot comprehend a 
view which seems to hold Inflexibly to 
the present form and extent of Gennan 
rearmament. We have accepted and 
even encouraged rises in the German 
mllltnry contribution to NATO In certain 
circumstances In the past. I do not see 
that we Can.lOt accept and encourage 
decline" In that contribution in other 
Circumstances In the future. 
SeCUrity needs are ever-changlnr 
needs. Western German reannament is 
not an end In ItseU. It Is for the pur~ 
pose of the defense of Oerman freedom 
In common with the dctense of the free-
dom ot Lhe Western community. It Is 
not tor the purpose of keeping rigid the 
tables of orSllnlzation and the projec-
tions of presumed needs by Lhe mllltnr), 
command of NATO. The6e projections. 
In any event. hn-ve not been met for 
years and the world has not yet come to 
an end. 
TIle nature and extent of Gennan re-
armament and at non-German arma-
ments on German SOil. in short. Is one 
area ot the problem of unification In 
which rcasonable proposals for negotia-
tion. wllerever they mny originate. 
ought not to be rejected out of hrl'nd. 
That Is especially the case If thcse pro-
posals are rclated to the reduction of 
ml!ltary power throughout Central 
Europe. I know full well that the Rus-
sians may havc no Intention of with-
drawing from the Eastern European 
States in nny circumstances. NC\'crthc-
less. I can see no reason to make It 
easier for them to justify their remain-
hltj: by a seeminll Intransigence on our 
part. 1 cannot sce that the road to the 
eventual frcedom of states like Poland 
nnd Creehoslovakla Is madc casler b)' 
such a process. 
II.1JSIIU,," .ou 1>/ THE CO"",,",; CI\,SI!l 
Mr. PresJdent. let me turn now to thc 
qucstion of RUSSian Intentions In the 
coming crisis In Gcrmany. In this mat~ 
ter tllere Is only one certain course. 
Whatever they may do. we must assume 
that the Russians are actins 10 cnhance 
the position or the Soviet Union ancl that 
of totaUtnl"lan communism throughout 
Gcrmany and Europe. We must tliso ns-
sume that they will use whatever meth_ 
ods they bellevc \\\11 lead to these ends. 
not excluding aggressive war. The Rus-
sians may blow hot or they mny blow 
colct. Thcy may clown a plane on thcir 
border onc clay. They may release a. 
blocked convoy thc next. We cannot 
know with certainty why the)" act as they 
act a,I. any {liven momcnt. 
We cannot know with certainty the 
purport of Mr. Mlkoyan's recent viSit t o 
the United States. we cannot know with 
ccrtalnt,y the meanlns of Mr. Khru-
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shchcv's comments on a thaw In thc cold 
waf. They may be meant to provide a 
~eUing for sucecssful negotlatlons. They 
may be meant simply to confuse or be-
guile. 
If they do confuse, If they do beguile, 
however. we shall have no one to blame 
but ourselves. We ought to be able by 
this Ume. years after the Ill-fated Gene_ 
va Conference of 1955, to distinguish 
between the conc!l!atory gesture and the 
act of conciliation. Those of us who 
come from the cold country have learned 
through bitter experience that winter 
thaws can be followed by summer frosts. 
The promise of spring in February Is not 
the same as the coming of spring In May. 
There Is, as 1 say. no way of knowing 
v .. lth certainty what some particular So-
viet gesture or other slgnitles. What we 
can know, Mr. President, Is that they are 
all, gOO<1 or bad, peripheral to the cri~i~ 
which l~ coming in Germany, ML', Mi-
koyan's visit is not going to free us from 
that criSis, Mr, Khrushchev'S thaws w!ll 
not do it, Increased Soviet-American 
trade has little relation to It, 
l! we are to be prepared to face this 
crisis in Germany it will be best not to 
become distracted or obsessed by the 
twists and turns of Soviet behavior, It 
'\I.'HI be best to keep our eyes on Germany, 
The fundamental question of policy for 
WI Is not so much what the Rus.slans are 
looking for In Germany, We know what 
they are looking for; and they may very 
well seize It while we amuse or faselnate 
ourselves by trying to interpret the 
charades of Rus.slan behavior, 
No, Mr, President; more important, far 
more Important, to us Is to know what 
we ourselves are seeking in Germany, 
We must bring to thll'; eril';is not only 
courage, but also conViction. We must 
bring to It a positive and understandable 
policy which meets our es.senUal national 
needs and the es.senUal n(!(!ds of freedom, 
TIn:: ~NT1AI.S 01' A WESTnN PQl.ICT IN TilE 
COMINC C1I151$ 
As I noted earllel' In my remarks, Jt 
Is not for the Senate to direct the Presi-
dent and the Secretary of State In the 
conduct of the foreign relations of the 
United States. Dut it is a responsibility 
of Senators to try to contribute con-
structively-and I wish to repeat the 
word "constructively"-to the policies 
which govern those relations. lL is In 
that sense, Mr. President, that I seek, In 
these final comments, to express the 
thoughts which this exploration sug-
gest.s--thoushts on the essentials of a 
sound Western policy for the coming 
crisis In Germany. I have no cryStal 
ball, I have 110 secret information. I 
have not been coached by anyone, nor 
have I been a~ked by anyone to dell vcr 
this speech. What I suggest may not be 
valid In thc light of the creatcr under-
standing of others. It is one Senator'S 
views, based UllOn what he has read, 
what he has heard, what he has tried to 
reason. It is, In short, the course which 
suggests itself to me 011 the ba~ls of the 
understanding which I have been able to 
draw out of the confUSion and complex-
Ity of the German situation. I can be--
and may well be-wrong: and I stand 
ready to aeeept a better llluminaUon of 
the problcm through discussion and de. 
bate in the Senate. For whatever they 
may be worth. howcver,l outUne the fol-
lowing points as essentials of a sound 
Western policy on Germany. 
First. It Is essential, Mr. President, 
that forces representing the concept of 
freedom In peace not be driven out of 
Berlin. They need, at the least, to re-
main on a basis of equality with the 
forces of totalitarian communism In the 
future capital ot Germany. If those 
forces are to have a chanee to remain In 
peace, a Western Initiative for peace Is 
essential. 
Second. It Is time to call upon Gennan 
leaders of the two BerUn communities--
East and West-to begin serious el'l'orts to 
unify the municipal government and 
public services of that city. 
Third. To that end. Mr. President, It 
would be helpful to enlist the concilia-
tory services of the Secretary General 
of the UnIted Nations. J! agreement 
can be reached by East Germany and 
West Germany to establish an all-Berlin 
government, then It will be desirable to 
replace both Soviet and Allied forces 
with a United Nations interim pollce 
force composed of contingents from na_ 
tions not directly Involved. That force 
might 5upervi~e the agreement, and 
might sec to It that all the routes of 
access to the city remain open until Bel'-
Un once again becomes the capital of a 
peaceful, unlfted Germany. It may be 
that In the B~rlin micrOCOSm there may 
evolve paUerns of unification which will 
be applicable to the larger problem of 
all-German unification. 
Fourth, If this approach or some such 
approach to a unified, neutrallzed Berlin 
falls, Mr. President. then It Is essential 
that the forces representing the concept 
01 IreeClom In peace III Herhn rem::l.ln III 
Berlin, regarClless of whether the Rus-
sians leave. Let them go, if they will. I 
would not wiSh to see this country a party 
to any Insistence that they stay. 
Fifth. At the same time. howevcr. the 
forces rcpresenting free<iom In Berlin 
must be Gennanized as rapidly as pas. 
sible. It is time to think seriously of 
replae!ng the thousands of alUed mili· 
tary personnel In Berlin with German 
ml1!tla, fully supported by NATO guar-
antees. 
Sixth. Some may regard dlseUs.~lons 
betw(!(!n Germans of the West and Gcr-
mans of the East as tantamount to recog· 
nltion of the East German Communist 
regime. Some who regard as appease-
ment not only talk. but even thought, 
which apparently is allen to them. on the 
serious problems of the Nation, may even 
go so far as to label wIth this stamp of 
pol!Ucai chicanery any llropos,,'lls of 
mcetlnss between East and West Ger-
mans. Let them do it, Mr. President; it 
15 their prlv!Jcge. 
But let me say thls:1f talk constitutes 
recognition or appeasement, then we 
have appeased and reco;nized Commu-
nist China. because a representative of 
this Government has becn talking on Its 
behalf, on and Olf, for years, with a Chi. 
nese Communist representative In Gen. 
eva and Warsaw, Il talk constitutes 
reeognltlon or appeasement, then the 
Wcst Germans have recognized and ap-
peased Pankow for yenrs. The fact is 
that East Germans and West Germans 
have worked out practlcal agreements of 
various kinds between the two zones of 
Germany. Ai; early as 1951, West Ger-
many's exports to E:lst Germany tot the 
year totaled $201 million. During the 
first half of IS58, $125 million in trade 
moved In each direction. That kind of 
trade, Mr. President, does not take place 
without talk. 
I do not know what the theory of 
International law may be. I do not 
know \\'hether talk is tantamount to rec· 
ognltlon. I do know that, as a practical 
matter, we have talked with, but have 
not recognized, Ccmmunlst China. West 
Germans have talked with and traded 
with, but have not recognized, Pankow. 
What Is Involved In the coming erlsls In 
Germany Is not a clas.sroom problem on 
the theory of international Jaw. It Is 
the life or death problem or peace or 
war. The stake Is the lives of tens of 
mHllons Of human beings, Americans 
Included. 
I cannot see that there Is going to be 
any peaceful solution of this problem 
without a great deal of talk-between 
Gennans who are In authority In the 
Federal Republic and Germans who pur-
port to be In authority In the Eastern 
zone. It seems to me essential, more-
over, that this talk cover the whole range 
of problems of unification of the two 
zones, the whole range of problems In-
volving the ll!lrmonizlng of the political, 
economic, and military systems of the 
two zones. 
Seventh. There 15 a point beyond 
which the SeRl'Ch for peace can lead to 
the jeopardizing of freedom. Regard· 
less of whatever agreements emerge, it 
seems to me essential that the people of 
East Gennany have wme genuine choice 
In the 101m Of ContrOl which Is exerclsecl 
over them. There mUSt be provision tor 
the protection of the rights of all peace-
ful political forces in all Gennany. All-
German elections may not be essential_ 
although I think them highly deSirable-
but at least there must be a chance for 
men and women of Eastern Germany, as 
lII'ell as those of Western Germany, to ex-
press themselves and their polltlcal pref-
erences and to partiCipate In political 
atTairs without the threat of terror. 
WhMever may be the details of the 
fUSion of the two zones, they are best 
left to the Germans of the two zones. 
The Gcrmans are likely to know better 
than anyone else what will suit them and 
what Is possible among them, Further-
more. It Is Inconceivable that at this late 
date the erstwhlle allies or World War II 
can work out these details on their 
behalf. 
Eighth. The eontrlbutlon which the 
Western allies, as well as the SOviet 
Union, need to makc, If there is to be 
pence, Is to guarantee, tor a period or 
tune, the kind at unified Germany which 
ma.y cmerge from disclltslons among the 
Ocrmans. What the former allies need 
to do Is to see to it that a unified Ger-
many neithcr Is subjected to military 
pressures from Its neighoors, nor be-
comes a source of military prcS!!\lre to 
its neighbors. 
Ninth. To that end, Mr. President, It 
Is essential to include within the scope 
or our policy the search for agrecment.s. 
Which, while Ihey do not compel a sever-
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nnce of West Germnny's numerous ties 
with western Europe, may lead to IIml. 
tatlons of armaments throughout Ger. 
many and central Europe. Also needed 
are agreements which wUl pull back the 
so-called ultimate weapons and thc 
armed forces of both Eru;t and Wcst 
from the points of Imminent contact In 
Germany and in central Europe. In 
short, Mr. President., It seems to me 
essential that our !>{lllcy, NATO's poli-
cies. do not exclude n careful considera-
tion of the Rapackl Plan. the Eden Plan 
for a demilitarized zone in middle 
Europe. or similar proposals In connec-
tion with the unincatlon of Germany. 
Perhaps the best way to consider tl)ese 
matters would be to predicate them'on 
reasonable agreements which may 
eme~e from the Geneva Conferences on 
Surprise Attacks and the Suspension of 
Nuclear Tests. 
N~w getting back to what th~ distin-
guished senior Senator from Ohio (Mr. 
UUSCUE] mentioned II. while ago, he 
ru;ked, I believe. If I rcc:lgnlzed the sig-
nificance of a pullback and how It would 
benefit the Soviet Union. I do recognize 
that In some kindS of pul\back the West· 
em Powers would receive \he worst of 
It. but I think we ought to recognize 
also that If there Is to be any poSSlb!llty 
of peace. we Shall have to make some 
conccs.slons; this might be one of them. 
We need to reeogn.lze that In so doing. if 
a withdrawal. based on a reasonable 
6OIuUon were brought about, w'C would 
be the ones who would take a loss In 
position, since the Soviet divisions. In gO-
Ing back to the heartland. would be in 
striking distance and would be better 
prepared than we would be to carryon 
an), rnllltary activity In that area. Dut 
we have to develop give and take,l. by 
starting from the noU.om and worJ<lng 
upward. If we do not get out of the 
position of rigidity. I blJleve the situa-
tion In Berlin and In Germany will be-
come worse, and the bases on which 
there, GP:n be peace will bec.ome fewer 
and tllwer: 
MI, LA,SCIm: Mr. President. will 
the Senator yield? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. 1 yield to the Sen-
ator tram Ohio. I 
MI. LAUSCHE. I agree with the 
statement 01 the. Senator. In my opin-
ion. there Is a condition existing in 
which. If the Soviet Government" con-
tinues to dictate to the government of 
East Berlin. It will be Impossible to bring 
about a reconcillation of East and west 
Berlin. SOviet Russia will not tolerate 
it. Bru;ed upon the adamant position 
01 SOviet Russia. and based upon the 
rigidity of the situation as described by 
the Senator Irom Montana. while the 
matters about which I have spoken are 
hlghl)' desirable, I ag:ree we should look 
for other avenues to escape the great 
holocaust which seems to be threaten-
Ing us In the futUre. I, for one-and I 
believe confirmation has been given to 
this view by the mayor of West Berlin-
would want every avenue explored. talks 
had, continued talks, In the hope that 
60rne solution may be found. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is 
correct. 
No.24-S 
Mr. President. I have taken a /!Teat 
deal of the Senate's time today. I have 
tried not to take It lightly. I have done 
so be<:ause It Is clear·that this adminis-
tration, following the example of Its pre-
decessor. has committed the Nation. to 
stand fast Ilt Berlin. 
It Is a resolve well taken. Since we 
cannot yet perceive to what extremity 
of sacrifice It may lead in the months 
ahead. I have felt It essential to try 
to set forth for the consideration of the 
Senate my understanding of what is In_ 
volved In the coming crisis In Germany. 
I am grateful that In this crucial lime 
the Senate's prlclpal member In these 
matters. the outstanding Senator from 
Arkansas (Mr. FuLBRICtn') is a man with 
such a deep understanding lind Intelli-
gent grasp of the Intel'llatlonal forces 
that play on the Nation. 1 hope that he 
will make his voice heard: I am sure 
that the President and tile Secretary of 
State will listen mQl;t carcfully. I 
would hope. further. that bet .... ·een them 
will evolve a pellcy that ail of us. as 
Americans. will be glad to support. 
MQI;t Important. Mr. President. I hope 
that the President of the United States. 
his Secretary of State. and the CongreM 
will fortify the resolve t.o stand fast In 
Berlin with the conviction .... hlch only 
a positive policy for peace can give It. 
The Secretary of StlLte has spoken of 
mutual conceSlSions. Those are calm and 
wise words for this moment In time. with 
the clOUdS of radioactive death wa.ltlng 
to envelopc the earth. I hope. deeply. 
that they will lead to a poSitive pollcy 
for peace. It is tIl::t kind of a policy 
for which rational men everywhere are 
waiting. It is tha.t kind of a policy 
whkh tht'y will be nble to c.omprf'hl'nd 
and to which. if need be. the)' wlil be 
able willingly to consecrate their livt's. 
The policy ha.s yet to be formed. It 
needs to- be formed soon. If It Is 
formed, the concept of freedom In peace 
wlil not perish in Berlin. in Ocrmllny, 
or in the wocld. 
Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. Presi-
dent. will the Senator yield? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. 1 yield. 
Mr. JOHNSON of Tcxas. 1t has Dcen 
a treat to be privileged to hear an exccl-
lent speech. such as a thc one which 
hns just been concluded by a great mnn. 
The distinguished Senator from Mon-
tana has made many contributions to 
the cause of peace In the world. but 
none more Important than his forceful 
statement today. Alwa)'s responsible. 
always constructive. wc his colieagues In 
the Senate tal(e great. pride in serving 
with him. 
On behalf of the Stale which I repre-
sent. I wish to Say t.o the State from 
which he comes that the world Is a bet-
ter world because of Muh; MANsrIELo. 
and that the suggestions he has made 
today. predicated upon the /!Teat phi-
losophy of Isalah's advice. "Come now. 
let us reason toge\.her:' should be heard 
around the world. 
I thank the Senator for his construc-
tlve contribution. I feel very humble 
to be able to sit in his presence. 
Mr. MANSFlELD, I tha.nk the distin-
guished Senator from Texas. 
Mr. President. I yield the noor. 
Mr. WlLEY. Mr. President, 1 was 
given a copy of the ftne address which 
the distinguished Senat.or from Mon-
tana delivered today. I read It. and I 
have heard part of the address today. 
I all:ree very much with the very nne 
encomium paid by the distinguished ma-
Jorlt)· leader to the S:mat.or from Mon-
tana. As many folks have said. "MIKE 
MA);SnnD is a real guy." I agree ",Ith 
that statement. 
J can agree with much the Senator 
from Montana has stated. I particu-
larly agree Dbout the need for us In this 
Chamber to discuss responsibly and con-
structively not only foreign poliCies but 
also aU measures in that manner. Pull 
and free debate was and is an essential 
element. of a bipartisan approach. 
I wish to say to the very able Senat.or, 
there Is no need for the Senat.or to re-
assure the Senate regarding his serious 
purpoae and his careful Choice of words. 
I and my colleagues on this side of the 
aisle always are confident the Senator 
wlll give 6Ober.intelligent and construc. 
tlve addresses on any subject. foreign 
policy or anything else. He Is "that 60rt 
of gUY:' as someone has said. The Sena-
tor has set high standards for himself, 
and I congratulate him. 
I should Ilke to record my agreement 
with the Senator concerning the serious-
ness of the Berlin situation and the need 
for al1 of us to maintain open minds nnd 
the utm06t of flexlbll!t)', in conslderir.g 
possible avenues for a possible resolution 
of Lhe problem. !n accord with the free 
..... orld Interest. Indeed. I think we have 
ben given a sound IIccount of the back-
ground of the situation in Germany. liS 
well n$ a number of ciues-I hesitate to 
caU them oil essenlials-t.o~';ard flmllng 
the peaceful solutlon ..... e seek. 
However. I should also like testate my 
belief that at }east Lwo main elemenl..s 
!n the current O~rman scene have been 
bal'ely mentioned In my colleague's not. 
Ilblespeech. 
The first missing ingredient concerns 
the past and continuing requirement 
that the United S"tates consult with and 
move in concert with its allies. e~peclally 
F'rnnce. Great Britain. and West Ger-
mony. There is no question that I.he 
Sovlct Union. acting only in Its own In-
tefestll. In the very nature of things has 
been able to represent itllelf as ostensibly 
more fleXible thlln the West In propn-
ganda Rnd dlplomntlc approaches to 
central European problems. 
We must remember that the west 
German Government itself hilS been n 
foremost exponent of firmness In dealln", 
with the U.S.S.R. This point golns In 
importance ""hen \\'e recall the remarks 
made by the Senator about the unlfl.ca-
tion Question being one for Rction by the 
Dermans themselves. 
We kno\\' who holds the strings in Ea~t 
Germany. We know who controls E~.~t 
Germany. We might as well look that 
Inct In the face. They not only control 
East Germany. but they also conlrol 
CZeChOllloVRkia. Bulgaria. Romania. and 
1111 the Baltic States. It is not a Ques· 
lion of the East Germans and the West 
Germllns getting together. 
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We were told the other day by WUly 
Brandt, Ii. statesman. which wu con-
firmed to me pe~lly by Mr. Ade-
naUf, that If the East Germans had their 
own way 9.5 percent of them WQuid Join 
with the West. 
In fact, I could not help feelinr that 
the address of my dlsUl\j'Ulshed collea,ue 
had a slight tone In It which was hard 
to undel'fiUnd. The Senator seemed to 
alternate back and forth between ,\vlnl' 
us and the Oermans primary responsi-
bility for taklnr the Initiative. I do not 
complain. fOf this Is a natural conse-
Quence of the Ireat complexity ot the 
luues at ,take. More Important. I do 
not complain of any sacrtt:ce of ftexl-
bllle), which may be Inherent In our need 
to act in .,recment with our amea, for 
I am certain th.t we can all .rree the 
Western al\lance Is the cornentone or 
the tree world .ecuflty, 
The second mininl iniNdlen!. In my 
view, is the Jack of recorn1tlon accorded 
to the efl'ortA of our Government and to 
the etrortA of our aUiell over the yeau, 
to $BY nothln, of the recent concentrsted 
work over the pa.t weeks and months, 
to""aro ftndln, wa,.. to nelOUattl thl. 
e)l[ tremely serious problem. In fact, the 
headlines this morn1n1 contain new. of 
Western w!lUnlne" to widen the 1C0pe 
of en vlsa led neloUations, which con-
ftrrm the activities of Mr. Dulles and his 
European counterparts. Clearly, our 
poUCY hu not put us In a etraltJacket. 
I think It Is also clear that my col-
lea~e hU,1n the fUhlDn of Don Qubote, 
bun dolna: a little tntlnl at a stone well, 
and that stone "aU is tbe Kremlin, not 
the Eut O ennan,. 
Despite these few dlmcultles I have 
encountered .50 far, I thank the dlsUn-
Kulshed Senator from Montana. In a ll 
urlousness. for a hllbly lIlumlnaUn, 
presentaUon of the crux o f the Berlin 
problem. lam not prepared to comment 
in depth on hIs usefUl address. because 
I ha\'e not had time tor that. However, 
as frequently happena. Mr. Walter Upp-
mann', column of t<lis 1l10rninK contallUl 
.5Ome thoughts which I COlUlJder ex-
tremely pertinent to this subject . .50 I 
ask unanimous con¥flt that there may 
be printed at thIs point In my dIscussIon 
the comment.s of Wall.el" LJppmann in his 
article of this momlna:. 
There beIng no obJection. the article 
was oroered to be print.ed In the RUOIID, 
",follows: 
Ma. Dvu._ 111 N-.. 
There II no re"-'On 1.0 doubt. thU .John 
~let" Dull". .. Ill 011<:<1 'K.ln come out on 
top. C&l"Tled throulh hla O<1Ieal not only by 
hi. It.am.ln'. whiCh II t.buioul. but .IK> hy 
th~ knowledge th.t he I,.t lh.ll moment tho 
Indll:p"n .. ble mlUl. Ttlece hue been limn 
In the paat when ttungB ...... e .. t the end ot 
• ch"pter ... nd he could .. Uh graee IUId dl,-
nlty have mad .... y for' younKer ""... But 
not lun n...... Thll lI. periOd .. hen thin,. 
.. re movll'l towlU"d • dhn"" .• Iter whiCh tht 
world ""'y be vtr,. dllf..-eo>t. IUId he. hhnMlf, 
u at thecllmu 01 hi. care«. 
There 1.1 no one tiM In the We-tern World 
W"O h ..... uthorUy. eomparable with hll. to 
leo.d t b. enonnoully comple:t negotilltlOnl 
.. bout Ge. "",ny IUId .bout Europ" whiCh In. 
on. way or lUIother Me no .. unavOld"bl ... nd 
Imp" ... Uve. 11 the Weat mov.,.. aa I~ mu.t. 
from • pol icy of l\.andlnl pat. to One 01 
n"Kotl .. tlon .nd <:OD>prom1te. bl.l pel"loOn"l 
leo.dershlp .... 111 be the beet r uare.ntee tbU 
flUlblUty II not flabhlnteS IUId that •• tron, 
and touKh h .. nd lIln chlU"l" The RUMI .. n. 
will malr.. no dlUlleroua. rnlltU:ea whll. h. II 
there ..... d our alll" wU1 be mUCb Ieee .ppr._ 
belUlve. 
There I. one queotlOn .... hlch. It .. e kne .. 
the a.n.awtr to It. WOUld 1I,ht up the .. hoi. 
.Ituatlon. Why I. It th.t Mo.eo .. haa opened 
up Be.lln .nd til.. GermlUl qUMUon no.. 
rather thlUl. let u. My. 2 yeu. hence? Th. 
Ru .. l .. n. kno .. qUlttl well th .. t Oerm .. n opin-
Ion II evolvln" .nd that D •. Aden .. ue.·, .,. 
fu .. 1 to n"KOtlat. on. reall.tlc baall .... m not 
be held to by hi, IUCceUO ... In 2 yea ... Mr. 
Dullel will be out ot oI!lc., IUId unlU ,·try 
recently the .... aa no difference between hi. 
poIltlon .nd Dr. Ad.nauer·,. In 2 yM .... 
morean., the .... 1lI h+-If til., Ru .. l.n. bI_ 
U ...... 11.'1 &'nltol' 8""'11<01'0>< IUId Ollllr, 
.. y_ mu1r.ed eblfl In the ballUlC. of »OWU. 
Why. then, ... th., In IUCh • hurry DOwt 
Ny own lun, ... hlCh retttl only On hlnle and 
Inler,Ii"... II that Ih.y .. ,ltd til.. pa.ltlon 
In Eaatern Otrmany, and perhapt alK> In 
EMtern Europe, at prec.rlOUl .nd pol'lMI.Uy 
npIOll... Thty .rt deeply concerned, II 
,v"yone 1r.no .. l. about wut Oerm .. n rev ... a.-
ment ..... hlch .. III h ••• been ac:hl ... 1d In 
.bOUt 2 reus. Why u. th.y K> concerned 
.bout It .. hen th'y tbemt.hu h ........ y 
mUCh bl'IU ......" .nd .... tao thelnNl ... 
• Ilnt-cl ... nuel .... po .... t When I aalr..td 
10m. of the PIOpl, I .... In Voaco .... hy th'7 
.... o .. led K> much .bout Wpt Oerm.n .... ma_ 
men! .... hen they cOUld .nnlhllale Welt O1!r-
many wIth their Int •• medlate_nz'K' mllell" 
the Itock .nl .. " waa that they rearld .n 
armed Oermany blc1r.ed b1 til.. United 8tat ... 
But J dO not thInk that thl.l Ia the 9111.011 
nplan .. aon 01 th'lf I .. r, or, rath.r, J dO 
not think thlt It ,pellt out til.. n.tlU. of 
thel. Itill. My PeN I. UIt.! they h .... no 
1l\\alonl .bout the dlaCOntent of the Eaa! 
Oerm.na, .nd that .... hat they fe .. II that 
the Za.ot Oerm.", ... hen they He • nO'onl 
WMt Oerm.n army 1_ th .. n 2 hOur, ..... y. 
m.y be IOrely tl!IJIPled to .tart lUI uprlalnl 
In Clhoota .. Itll oftlce .. ot tile WMt Oermln 
•• my. It that hlppene<l, the rat would b. 
In the n.e Ind both the United 8ltteo Ind 
~h. U.S.S.R- .... ould be Involved. 
8om,,"ln, or thla K>rt lI, I feel aure. the 
CN~ or lh. Oerman problem tad.y. There 
" .... enr_pr_nt .nd g:ro .... ln' d.n~~ of 
,uolt In EalItarn Europe .... blch would ,ntall 
8o"rlet Ulurventlon In the Huol.rlan mln_ 
ner IUId "'ould unuold.bly brlnl .bout • 
,ren .... r, The RUNI.n ... re undOUbtedly 
.... orrled lbOut thl •• and trUly reaponalb1l 
men In .. ll the Welte.n caplt .. 11 .'e equ .. lly 
.. orrled about II. Only tha.e .... ho hllV, more 
emoUon lhan they have lmasln .. t.lon and 
fo.eol8ht take the .Ie .. that lUI Eaat Euro-
pe"" uprlllo, would be. .... onderful .nd IUlt 
.... hat the Iree world .. anti. 
It 1.1 the Impendln, d"n,er In Eutern 
lturope Which mue. It Imper .. tiv. to mov. 
1oO-..cI Ge ..... n ntiotlUlotl.l, For the "beoIt, 
.. nd perh .. PI til.. only ..... y to • .,ert the d.n_ 
Ktt 1.1 to mo •• to .... rd Ihe beKlnnlngB of the 
reunlftC"ation 01 the two GermlUl,.. We 
Ihould make the Kremlin underst.nd Ihlt 
..... epproMh til.. OOmlrlg necoUatlon •. not 
... Ith Intl!M to provoke In uprl.llng In Eaatttn 
Europe, but In ordtr to nnd .. n .. Itern .. -
tive to It. 
The R .... I.n problem In Germ.ny .nd Eu _ 
rope 1.1 nOt hOw to oonquer .. nd .. b5Olb w.t_ 
ern EUrop". Thl. Ia ...... y beyond .... ytllln, 
that 1.1 within their re.ch. The Ruttl.n 
problem I, ho .. they elUl dlaenrase them_ 
..,lve. In Eaatern EUrope .. Ithout leopllldlz_ 
Inl their Own .aeutlty. HOW can Ihe 8lItI!l_ 
lite. becom •. not their viOlent eneml". but 
neutrBI$1 At bottom the problem 10 how to 
let 10 .. lthout t.U\nil oil' .nd bellli ruu over. 
Mr. WILEY. Mr. P resIdent. I have 
gone over theoe ~nts ... hleh the dis-
tinguished senator from Montana has 
made. The Senator places Kreat em. 
phasls on the fac~ that ultimate unlftca_ 
tlon of Gennany \.s Inevitable. and that 
we Mould have recognized It and should 
have done more about It, 
Exactly v,'hat ahould we have done? 
When we are faced. l\.IallUlt the Krem-
Jln, which has taken 000 million human 
beinlll Into It.s orbit, and when the 
UnIted. States has-placed. as It were, 11.11 
Iron eurtain aKainst the approach onto 
West Germany and onto France and the 
Lowland$-what e.hould we have done? 
Let us eOlUllder. The fact is that the 
Inevitablllty of the ultimate reunitlea-
tlon of Germany has been reeogruzed by 
the Western countries alnce the end of 
World War U. That has been common 
talk Germany hu to be brought to-
,ether. UnlfteaUon has to come. 
We have not only recognized that fact. 
but ,,'e have allO recOlnl%ed that a d i-
vided Oennany cOMtitUtes a serioUl 
th rut to the peace. W illy Bre.ndt was 
quoted by the newlpapef3 }'esterc1ay. 
after he had had a talk with the ~­
dent. as saying that c1eftnltely the Pres-
Ident said ",'e are not Eo!ng out of Ber-
lin, We are lUCking. We are there 
with the purposes we have always hA4, 
That. in substance, was the remark. 
We have not only recogruzed thl4 faet, 
but we have re¢olnll'.ed. that a dlvlded 
Germany consUtutes a threat to tho 
peace. Both the Republican and DEmo· 
eraUc admlnlstratiolUl alnee 19~5 and 
1948 have made unrelentlna: etrorts to 
brl~ the four ton~ tQff;ether. I re-
member the etroN whleh have been 
made time after time. 
We actually 1I"0t an agreement at the 
Oeneva Conference In 1955 tor a re-
unlftcatlon of Oennany and for free 
eleetlons. What happened? Of course, 
the RusslalUl broke the aKreement wIde 
open. The Russlall3 reneKed on the 
aareement. All of the lubsequent er-
tortA to achieve reunlfteation. including 
the notes we sent last fall, have tailed. 
We hM'e been working at this a long 
time. 
I desire to give credit where credit Is 
due. I do not care to say simply that 
we are at fault If we cannot get a gov-
ernment to reMOn with 1.18 and to work 
wIth us. That Is what has happened . .50 
far as the Kremlin 14 concerned. but we 
have been on the job. 
As I have said, In Oeneva we obtained 
an aKreement for tree elections. \'Iho 
pushed that aireement? We did. After-
ward It went out the window. The rea· 
SOli the West Oermans have been re -
butred Is that the Sovlcts have been un-
willing th Alree to any plan of reunl!"lea· 
tLon which would not Kuarantee the 
bolshevism ot Westcrn Oermnny and Its 
annexation to Eastern Oermany . 
This Is not the ftrst Ume In world t,; -
tOry that .... e hnve been unable to obtain 
a.ueements that were valid. and that 
would be kept by the other party. Out of 
52 aKreements we made with the K rem· 
lin. the Kremlin broke 50 of them. That 
Is the situation we are meetlnK. We must 
recognize thellmple fact that the SovIets 
have a clutch hold on Eastern German y. 
The OermalUl are not free. They are 
running out-400 a day. according to 
WUly Brandt. When we look that fact 
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In the face, we begin to realize what the 
trouble Is. 
The Senntor from Montana suggests 
that the way to work toward reunifica-
tion would be to start by having the west 
Gormans and the East Germans talk 
among themselves and attempt to nego-
Unte the unification of the two divisions 
of Berlin. 1 heard that talk on the noor 
today. That Is a consummation devoutly 
to be wished, but we cannot make an 
agreement with the slave when the mas-
ter pas the slave under his thumb. That 
is the situation. We might as well recog-
nize It. That Is what we have been try-
Ing to break down. If \.he master were to 
allow the slave freedom to work out his 
own salvation, 95 percent of the East 
Germans would vote for reunification. 
It Is difficult to see how the attempt to 
work out reunification could be any more 
successful than our past efforts with the 
Russians. We have tried to get the RUs-
sians to agree. The East Germans are 
not free to negotiate on their own. That 
Is the big poillt. They are controlled by 
the Russians. and therefore they would 
continue to reflect the Russian control. 
In effect. the Senator Is saying In his 
speech that the West Germans should be 
more flexible; they should enter Into 
negotiations with the East Germans. 
This Is something that the West German 
Government. UP to date. has refused to 
do. The West German Government is 
an Independent nation. It claims that 
East Germany is a part of Germany. 
The contentloll Is made that the United 
States can make the West Germans 
change their J>OSIUon and become more 
Ilexlble. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President. will 
the Senator yield? 
Mr. WILEY. Let me finish this para· 
ll"T3.ph. 
The tact Is that West Germnny Is a 
proud and powerful ally of the United 
States. AI; an ally. It has a mind of its 
own. and we ennnot dictate to It. as the 
Russians are dictating to the East Ger-
mans. The West Germans are the ablest 
people In Europe. They know the situa-
tlon; and when they tnke the position 
they have taken. they take It with their 
eycs open. They realize that they arc 
under the thumb of the Russians. or the 
Eo.st Germans. and they realize that they 
cannot even neGotiate with the people 
who are the sorfS. 
I now yield to the Senator from 
Montana. 
Mr. MANSF!ELD. Mr. PreSident. J be-
lieve thM there should be called to the 
Senator·s attention the fact that rela-
tionships exist at the present time be-
tWC<ln the East German Government and 
the West German Government. Such 
relationsillps have existed for some 
years. Those relationships are based 
upon Interzonal aereements. The reo 
suIt Is that trade amounting to hundreds 
of millions of dollars Is generate<! be-
tween the two areas. 
The $Cnator also makes the point that 
I seem to be advocating an American 
Initiative. What I have been trying to 
advocate Is a western Initiative. includ-
Inc all the allies, and Including West 
Germany. J do not think we can mnill_ 
taln a pctl"lflcd polley, because we know 
that there Is no prospect of going for_ 
ward on that basis. 
We are facing a deadline, May 27,1959, 
at which time the SOviet Union has In-
dicated It will have all its troops and de· 
pendent personnel wlthdrnwn from the 
eastern sector of the city. I think we 
must come Ui> with something In the way 
of alternntlv~. I was very plcased when 
Secretary Dulles came back and snld 
that he would be willing to consider con-
cessions on a QuId pro QUO basiS. 1 was 
dellghted with the degree of ~ueces~ the 
Secretary had achieved among our a\Ue~. 
Dr. Adenauer, General DeOaulle, Ilnd 
PrIme Minister Maemlliall. 
So I do not Quite get the point the dl~_ 
tingulshed Senator trom Wisconsin has 
!n rr.lnd, because, as I recall the speech 
I made. there seems to be very little 
difference between us. 
I expres.eed the hope that those In the 
Stnte Department would give some eon-
slderntlon to the speech made today. not 
because of any personal Interest I have 
In It, but beenuse ot the fact that some 
suggestions are belD/!" made. and perhaps 
out of those suggestions. or others which 
mny be generated, will come a degree of 
success In meeting the dlmculties which 
eontront us 1n the Ckrman and Bnlln 
s!tuatlon. and out of which. perhaps, may 
come unification ot the two DerUm and 
the two Germal,Ys a~ an earlier date 
than any of us can Ilntlelpate at the 
moment. 
1 thank the Senator for yielding to me 
and giving me an opportuniey to ans,,·er 
him III part. 
Mr. WILEY. Did the Senator ,,"Ish to 
address an)· i>artlcular Qu~tlon to me? 
In what direction did he desire to dlrect 
my thought? 
Mr. MANSFIElD. 1 wished to bring 
to the attention of the SCnator the fact 
that I understood him to sa)· that I was 
advocating American Ininatlve. 1 wall 
advocating Western initiative, which 
would include all Allied Powers. and also 
Dr. Adenauer. 
Mr. WILEY. I do not think we are 
very far apart. 
The only Lhlng I disagree with Is the 
ImplicatIon thllt there hns been no 
initiative. In my opInion the executive 
depllrtment. whose fUllctlon It is to 
hlVldle foreign relations, has done a great 
Job. As I said the other day, the situa-
tion Is similar to that of the man who 
has an ornCl·y jaeknss. He can talk to 
hIm and talk to him. but he h.w .better 
not get too close to him. or he may be 
kicked. 
The Secretary ot State and his aSSist-
ants have worked diliGently at thIs prob-
lem; Imd because they cannot get tho 
jackass to agree, they are to blame. 
That is the sort of Implication which 
I do not like to have go out to the COW1_ 
try. I ~l"Bnt the country definitely to 
understand my figure of speech. 
We are continually In the midst ot a 
political picture. I say. give credit where 
credit is due. Lnter, as 1 conClude my 
remarks, I shall have something to say 
about the distinguished SCcretary of 
State. He SCIVcQ under Acheson. Whell 
I was chnirman of the Commlttec on 
Foreign Relations. I snw his work. T 
observed his work as a servant of the 
Democratic Party. I have seen him serve 
for 6 years under PreSident Eisenhower. 
I have seen hIm get acquainted with this 
globe, as ""as Indicated by a distin-
guished columnist this merning. as no 
other man In history has done. He 
knowll every neighborhood. He knows 
all the peoples. HeJmows the problems. 
He has dealt with them. 
Because we could not get the divergent 
Interests to agree, he Is to blame. That 
Is what I am objecting to. Such an Im-
plication Is absolutely unfair. Un-
doubtedly It has had ruuch to do wIth 
sendIng Secretary Dullps to the hespltal. 
He Is only human. 
My next point is that the Senator from 
Montana, in his speech. asks that not 
only the We!t GermaDll, but the United 
States, tllke a more tlexlble approach to 
the problem Of German and European 
$ccurlty. The S~nator trom MentflOa 
mentioned the Rapnckl plan and the 
Eden plnn. and Sl\ld we should explore 
both ot them. We not only explored the 
Eden plan. but put It for .... ard as l!. West_ 
ern proPOSilI at the Oeneva Summit Con. 
ferenee. We have constantly been con-
sidering all kinds of possible European 
security plans. We have agreed that we 
must keep an open mind on,this subject. 
On the other hand, all these plans 
Involve a general1ll1thdrawal of Western 
strength from Western Europe; and we 
must be careful not to engage In too 
much loose talk about the seeming reo 
treat type of polley unless we have rea· 
son to bleleve that the Soviets are dis_ 
POSed. to Initiate a pullback toward theIr 
borders. As the Senator from Montana 
stated a reI" mInutes ago, they would 
get out of East Berlin: but they would 
be on the line where troops would be 
ready to march III and take over West 
Berlin. 
Our people are 1I0t blind. They recog-
nize the fact that they are dealing with 
some ot ~he most emclent-tr I might 
can them that-Internatlonal Machla_ 
veillans In history. In doing so they nre 
goIng to protect the Interests of the West 
and or America. 
we acree that we must kecp an open 
mind on this subject. On the other 
hand. all these plans Involve n general 
withdrawnl or Western strength from 
western Eurepe and we must be careful 
thnt we do not ellgllge In too much loose 
talk about this secmlngly retreat-type 
of poliCY unless lII·e ha\·e reason to believe 
that the Soviets are dISPOSed to Initiate 
n simUltaneous pullback of their torees 
toward their borders. Nothing In the 
prescnt situation gives us hope that the 
SOviets are. in fact. wil\mg- to Carry out 
a meaningful pullback ot their forees. 
Too much general talk regardIng neutral 
zones In wIthdrawal or thinning ,';It of 
our forees at this time. therefore, L"Ould 
gll'e the Impression ot softness 011 our 
pnrt and weakening of our resolve to 
stnnd flrm in this situation. 
Finally. the distinguished Senator 
from Montann sa}~ thllt standing firm In 
Berlin Is a slogall alld not a polley. 
The fact Is that standing firm Is the 
bedrock of our ])Olley. It is Quite true 
that. having taken this decIsion. the 
preblem of how we implement the stnnd 
In the fllCe of the many variations In 
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whIch the threat can actuall,y present 
Itself to us must be worked out.. That Is 
exactn' wtu.t the executive branch ha.s 
been explortng ever e1nce the crlsls de--
veloped and It was the primary reuon 
that secretary Dulles undertook hb re· 
cent trip. We and. oW' allies. IU'C all 
aware that we must not only be a&reed 
on the fundamental concept of s tandIng 
nrm; but that we must IlIao be ",reed on 
the details of Implementing this policy. 
It w'"' to help work out a common agree-
ment on these details that the secretary 
undertook thls trip to London, Parls, and 
Bonn. 
In other words. the Senator troll) Mon-
tana knOI\'S very well that the executive 
branch here, L'I well as the lovemments 
of our allies. knows that we must agree 
on the detailed Implementation of the 
polIcy In that we are all working now to 
Ict .areement on these details. 
When we do get a.rreements. what 
good are they? What does experience 
teach UlI. FIfty out of 52 allreementl 
were not worth the paper they were 
written on. The KlI.lser said something 
like that before. He spoke about a 
treaty being a scrap of paper. We are 
dealing with" people whoot! phl1050phy 
a.nd morality In connection with inter-
national alIalNl Is vety low. 
My overall reaetlon to the spee(:h of 
the Senator from Montana. h01l.·ever. Is 
that It Is a great deal more reasonable 
than many one hu to listen to. and 
there aTe a number of ~Uon&. u I have 
indicated. In the speech which make 
pretty good sense. 
I do wa.nt to make very clear that, l3 
the dlsUngulahed Senator hu said, when 
the Executive Is "In the saddle" and hu 
the re.spol13lblllty to deal with crises, and 
that because the IOlution which one hu 
hoped tor Is not forthcoming, that that 
Is no reason to crltlcll:e the executh'e 
branch Of our Oovernment. The Execu-
tive has had to deal wlt.h t.he representa-
tives of the Kremlin for mlLllY years. 
Our past experience, as I Indicated. 
sholtiS what aaTeement.! with the Krem-
Un are wort.h. 
I want to make It clear also. that In 
my humble opinion, the executive de-
partment has done everything that It 
can do to brlnli/: about a settlement of 
the German Issue. as well aa a settle-
ment on the wider scale of world ten-
sions, of which t.he Kremlin Is the source, 
In my opinion the Serlin crisis In con-
nection with the May date Is Il)erely an-
other Indication· of what we have had 
In the P84t. particularly lOme mont.hll 
liO In Formoaa. It Is the purpose of the 
Kremlin to get our attention on one point 
on this little Ilobe, and then do It.! ne_ 
fariOUS work at another point. The ex-
ecutive department Is keeping It.s eye on 
the whole show, 10 to speak. not merely 
on the Kremlin. and It recoenlzes t.hat 
this Is JUlt a paft of the world-dominat-
Ing InJluence and phUO$Ophy of the 
Kremlin. 
Mr. President. when I heard the other 
evenlne t.hat John Fo8ter Dulles had gon8 
to the hospital once again, I IMUed a 
release. and I ahall read that rtlease a~ 
this p:'oint. I said: 
AU Amerl"a na Ind men,. In tar 011' land. 
he ... d ,.IUI aorro,. ot Ihe hoepll-aUuUon ot 
Sohn Poater Dun~. Counuea thousa nda 
,.m pra ,. ror hI. recovery. 
Whe n I thLnk or hIm, Burke', deftnlUon 
of a au.teaman come. to my mind: He pCIoI_ 
_ "a dls poeLUon to pretetvt. en abLllt,. 
to Improve." 
He h .. aJ .... ,.. been Ha frIend to tru t h: 
In ac:tlon fa Ithful. a nd In h onor ele ... : .. ho 
broke no promlHl. oerved no prIvate end," 
Thea wordt Of pope "h ... ""lerl .... thk ,rnt 
public IUUIlt. 
Let UI hope tha t durin, hit connltlCence 
the carpIng voice. wUl ce .... 
In my opInIon no Amerl"an In !.he I"'t 
~ yea .. h .. gIven of hlmleLt more u naUnt.-
Ingly an(\ de<1lca ted hlmaelt more to preterve 
American than Poo\.er Dullea. When olhen 
thre .. brIck. a t him. he Imlied a nd kept On 
.. orklng tor !.he ,en. n1 ",dr.... . No m I n 
In Amerlcall hlttoty h .. become to "'eli ac-
quainted .. lUI thlt now neighbOrhOOd world 
-.nd I~ prllbleml. 
So we JoIn .. lUi the countl ... thou .. ndl 
who Wllh hIm a lpeed,. recover,.. Hit coun. 
try needs hIm. 
As the President and Wslter Lippmann 
have said. the country need3 him. 
Mr. CLARK. Mr. PreSident. will the 
Senator yle]d? 
Mr. WILEY. I am happy to yield to 
the senator from Pennsylvania. 
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I have 
listened w]Ul a great deal of interest to 
the ex~emely able addres:'l by my l ood 
friend from Wisconsin In defense of 
the State Department. 
Mr. WlLEY. I thank the senator. 
Mr. CLARK. I should like to ask my 
good frlend this Ques tion. Earlier In his 
remarks he offered for the RECORD the 
column wrltten by Walter LIppmann 
publil;hed In the Wuhlne ton Post this 
momlne. My Question is ..... hether he 
lirteS with that column. 
Mr. WILEY. I took Ule column from 
the paper. lLIld the part 'that 1 read I 
lirted .. o'\t.h. Ho ..... ever. I shall have to 1 0 
over It very closely, because the Impli-
cation Is that I am not a,,'are of IIOme-
thing In t.he article. I have not read It 
closely, because I have been waltlne for 
the senator from Montana to conclude 
his remarks. so tJ'iat I may obt:LIn t.he 
floor. 
Mr. CLARK. I .... ould be hsppy to 
have my good friend rtvlew Mr. LIpp-
mann's column. which I personally be-
Ileve Is a sound one. put whIch. It Se1lrns 
to me. Is rather Inconsistent with the 
point or vie ..... whiCh my friend from Wls-
cOl13ln has been so ably expoundIng. 
I should like to call to his attention 
the parts of the column I have In mind. 
and I should like to ask him .... hether he 
agrees that the principal point Mr. LIpp-
mann maku Is that the RUSSians are 
frlghtene<l by the IIltuaUon In eastern 
Europe and that they fear an explO&lon 
or revolution. and that such an explo-
sion or revolution might require them to 
rtpeat what t.hey did In Hun'gary; that 
Jt t.hey did It In Eastern Germany what 
they did In Huneary It ..... ould brln&: 
about the great daneer of starting 
world war In, because we would be un-
likely to pennlt East Oermany to 10 
down the drain the ..... ay we let Hungary 
go. Mr. lJppmann suggests t.hat t.he 
problem Is how we can prevent a revo-
lution In a sate\llte country and how we 
can maintain a situation In whiCh the 
Russians can get .out of satellite coun-
tries and the sateUlte countries can re-
main neutral and Serlin and Germany 
can stili be free. 
I suspect that what Mr. lJppmann 
says makes good sense and is pretty 
much the essence or the brilliant ad-
dress made by the Senator from Mon-
tana ...... It.h his nine points that he uraes 
upon the administration In that address. 
I do hope that the Senator from WIs-
con.s.ln " 'ill take anQther lOOk at the 
Walter LIppmann column. and I hope 
to nnd that he Is In agreement wlt.h it. 
Mr. WILEY. I shall be happy to read 
It lialn very closely, because I am al_ 
ways Interested In that the statesman 
Lippmann_and I would call him that.-
has to say. 
When he speaks about the fennent 
In Europe, that Is only a part of the 
story. There Is no question that there 
Is & fennent all over the world. One 
of the pl'oblems which Is confUlLlng the 
Russians and giving them much trouble 
at present. 8.5 the Senator probably 
knows. Is the attitude of the Chlne~e. 
There are 660 million Chinese who may 
be "on the go." All these matters have 
had the consideration of the Depart-
ment of State. The Commlnee on For-
el,n Relations has had this testimony 
before It. 
WUly Brandt, the Mayor or West Ber-
lin. W8$ asked the other day ..... hether 
the people In Poland. Rumanla. Bul-
garia , and the Baltic State3 had fallen 
Qleep and were aatlst'led ..... Ith their 
rulera. The ansllier. In his Judgment. 
Wh, "No", Of course. that g ives trouble 
to t.he Kremlin. That Is a part of the 
Russian problem. 
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the 
senator further yield? 
Mr. WILEY. I yield. 
Mr. CLARK. I haye no Intention of 
attrmnUna to pngaae In a debate con_ 
cernln&: ""hether the action of the State 
Department In the ))lilt has been rIght 
or ",·ron,. I think the senator from 
Montana (Mr. MO\NSFtELD) was very wise, 
Indeed.. In avoiding that pitfall. which 
it ..... ould be so easy to fall Into. 
I suggest to the senator trom WIs-
consin that we cannot solve this prob-
lem In the interest of peace and freedom 
merely by saying over and over again 
that the Ru~lal13 ha\'e broken 50 out or 
62 agreements. and that theretore It 
does not do any good to talk to them. 
I suggest that we must talk and talk 
and live with them, or else we wlll die 
with thcm. 
There are such things as selt-exe1lut-
Ing agreement.s. particularly with respect 
to the wlthdra ..... al of fo~es. which are 
enfotclble. and this regardle$lL of the 
clrcet of the written word. It has been 
my feeling that to have a more fle:dble 
pollcy toward negoUation Is highly 
deslrnble. 
I think the Senator from Montana 
has rendered a distinct service. because 
In many ways he Is sending word to 
the State Department and to the eoun-
try that. at leMt so tar D.'l a majority 
of the U.S. Senate Is concerned, we are 
ready right now to negotiate a meaning-
ful agreement.. 
We do not dismiss trom our minds 
plll.ns wh ich were ridiculed ..... hen they 
.... el'e firs t brought forward 2 yeal's agO 
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by Mr. Kennan, Mr. Oalt.skHl, Rnd M r. 
RaPllckl. and others. We will talk about 
IUly~hlng In· the Interest or getting a 
workable agreement towBrd peace. We 
lire not afraid t.o negotiate. We do not 
trust the Rutslans any more than some 
ot our friends In the State Department 
do. But that Is no ren3011 ror not Ilttlng 
down at the table nnd t.nlkilli with 
th~m. 
Mr. WtLEY. Acaln, the Senator {rom 
Pennsyh'an!a has rnflde an Implied at-
tack on the other branch ot the Govern-
ment. 
The Senator talks about tlrxlbllIty. 
Why does he not talk about t!exlblilty 
with the people who arc mOlt concerned. 
with It. instead ot maklnlil a general 
statement? That Is the point I (l.m mak -
InI:'. When 1 tr ied law.utt!. I tried to 
Bl"I'lve D.t eonc\us;ons on the tnets, not 
on Implications. not C:1 rumon. That 
WM my only point In I·al.slna: {hIe partic-
ular lull". 
'fhe Senator re!ers to the brel'lklna: 
by the RUMlan, of SO out of 52 Illilru-
nlent,. Let me tell the Senntor that It 
\I:as In the days before Pearl Hllrbor that 
t h], Chamber was as!up; the Pre,ldt'nt 
was asleep; the people '1l;"('re ulup; the 
Army, the Nnvy. and the Air Force ..... ere 
asleep. They aald It could not happen. 
It dId. That ..... as the only I"eason 1 re-
ferred to the breaklnlil by the Russian' 
of 50 out of 52 alilrccmenU. I do not 
wnnt to have this country IiIO to sleep on 
t he leneralily that It Is pOISlble to deal 
with a Skunk: or someone who dot's not 
keep fnlth. 
Mr. CLARK I think \lhnl the S('na_ 
tor from WiJ;COllsin htu saId and \lhnl 
J ha\·. laId ",!Ii ap)X'ar nccu"nt('ly In Ihe 
RECORD. as our lilood friend,. the OmcLal 
Reporters. wUI wnte It out. I hale 110 
Intention of enlilagm!j: in furliler colloquY. 
other than to say that I Implied nOUI:n'l. 
It .... as not I ..... ho apo!;e of tht' breaklna 
of 50 out of 52 agle<"rllents: It ... as my 
good friend. the Senator from WI-con-
lin. who did so. I am cont('nd to let the 
R ECORD stand as It '" III appeal' In Imnt 
tomorrow morning. 
Mr. WILEY. I agree thnt I made> the 
statement. I dId !lQ for the shllLlle r('ll.. _ 
son that men ILke the Senator from Penn _ 
Syll'anla \lere here a~ the time of Pcarl 
Harbor :md had uld It could not hap-
pen. I do not want the breaking or 50 
out of 52 agreemcn~ to be forgotten by 
the Senator from Penmylvanla eIther. 
Mr. CLARK. At the time of Pearl 
Harbor. I was in the uniform of my coun-
try. and not on the floor of the SCnate. 
Mr. WI LEY. Oh, YU. But other Sen-
ators were talking as the Senator from 
Penns)'lmnla Is now 61X'aklng. That Is 
the only pOint I am makIng. 
Mr. President. J yield the floo r . 
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr President, at the 
very be~l nning. I comm('nd the Senator 
from Mon tana for the study which he 
has gIven to the problem he dlsclls.'ed 
totlay. Speakmt; fo r mysclf, 1 wllnt the 
Soviet UnIon to know that the SeaRtors 
of tile UnIted States are Intently de-
sirous of obtalnln!! peace for the people 
of the .... orld. W hile I mllY sec some 
dlmeultles In carryillt; out the plans suq:-
ge~ted by the S~nator from M >Iltann. 
and projectln;;: them~ell'es OHI" his talk. 
I see II fervent purpose and desi re to 
bring about peace In the world. That is 
t he light In which I wish the people of 
Europe and the people of the world wouId. 
understand t he intention a nd tile pur -
pOse of the U.S. Senue today. 
Wh.o,t are some of the weaknesses 
",·h tch 1 sec In the prop.ou.1 made by the 
Senator from Montana? The Soviet 
aays: "We ""Ill wtthdNl.w from Eaat Ber -
lin." The questlon is, how far 'Rill they 
",-Ithdraw? In ",-hat POo1ture "" \11 they 
be afur they have wlthdul"n? In what 
position would ""e be It we withdrew from 
Welt B~rlln and mO\'ed a d illance of, 
61\1', 120 miles to the ""ut? 
My que\"y ""ould be: Bued upon the 
past conduct of the SovIet Union. could 
WI rely upon their word that they hal'! 
withdrawn and would atay wlthdra .... n? 
Or ",'ould there be the necessIty of nego-
tbtlng In • manner which ",'ould pre-
clude the POUlblUty of their abandoning 
theIr word and mO\'lna: immediately back 
Into the arca out ot ... hlch they came If 
conditions del'elJped which were un-
latl.sfocto\"y 
S:!cond. for the people of Wt";t Berlin 
and EiUt B'rlln to nea-OUate 'Rould be 
~Imple_ 1 think It is aeneraUy ... reed 
thaI 9S percent of them lI'ould lubscrlbe 
to the phllOlOphy of the West and ... ould 
rep:ldlate that of the East. If there 
"'ere a unlftcntlon of the ,ol'ernment of 
West Berlin and the IIO\'ernmenl ot the 
SOI'iet and communl~m In East Berlin. 
my qucry Is: Whlt type of aovernment 
would result? I cannot forlet what hap-
pened In China when a coalition jfOl'ern-
mellt waa formed J cannot for;tet ",'hat 
happened In YUl/v.lal'la when a cOILUtion 
I'OVCrnmcnt 11,.&$ formcd. and MlklmUo_ 
lich, the Iplrlt ot tllC ftllht tor freedom. 
was scuttlr-cl_ The result of !.hat coali_ 
tion IIOl'ernment 11,'1.1 that the Com-
m,-,n~t.s took control 
Nor can I forl'et what happened In 
Poland .... hen the SOviet Union propo6('d 
a coalition ao\-ernment, Thc coalition 
liIol'ernment Wal crelllcd, the Red 
troops were there. they took control a nd 
gave ordeT3, and loon the 10l"ernml'nt of 
Polnnd became n Communist lovern-
menl. 
But In this situation there Is one gleam 
of Illlht whICh would cause me to a nalyze 
the F..ast BerlIn and thl' West Berlin sit-
uation In lhe bel!t'! that It m ljfht be 
di~tlna:ulshed trom the YUII05lavill situ_ 
ation, the Cilma situation. and the 
Poland situation. In China. the SoIJet 
troops .... ere in the northl'rn part 01 that 
count\"Y. nnd lh~y dIctated what was to 
hnppeo_ A ~lmLL[l,r SItuation existed In 
Poland. In YUIIOIlavln, the word .... hlch 
cnme trom BrUnln and from the United 
States was thnt Mlhallo\'lch should be 
abandoned and T HO ehould be nccepted. 
Whnt would hallJl(' n In East Berlin and 
in Wcst Bcrl1n If those 1l0v Cl"lImen~ 
combIned and If the Soviet would stay 
bnck? In all the other countr ies I h nve 
mentloncd. conditions .... ere fe rUle for 
the O\'e rlhrow of those who wanted free _ 
dom and for the hlltallfltion of t hose 
.... ho wanted dictatorship, But that con-
dition would not prevail In Oermany. 
As we havl' said. in Oermany 95 percent 
of th~ people would stnnd by the govern-
)lIent:; of the f ree We~t. 
B ut despite my belief that these 
dalliers a re connected with the SUCges-
Uona which have been made by the Sen-
ator from Montana, I believe It Is tho 
r elponslblUty of the executive branch of 
our OOI'(' rnment and of th ill lea-Wa lL l'O 
branch to explore every means of reach -
Ina: In agreem~nt. restricted only by the 
propotllLon that we maintain our h onor 
and (hat ... e do not fa ll Into a pit which 
...ould leave UJ ""eaker, afUr " 'e nego-
tiated. than 'II'e "" e re before ""e began 
to neloUate. 
Mr_ President, I yield the floor. 
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positive Western policY on Germany, afC 
not numerous. In official pOl!cy-wlth~ 
out a Shadow of a doubt on the part 
of anyone, either Democrat or Republi-
can_we are committed to stand fast at 
Bcri!ll. We arc committed to the par-
ticipation of Germans of both zones in 
the! dlscussil,m of the problems of German 
unity. We are committed to explore ways 
other than nil-German elections, at least 
IlS a beginning of tile solutlon to the 
problem of German unity. We nre pre-
pared to consider proposals which s1)ek 
to limit certain types of weapons and the 
alien military forces In both parts of 
Germany within the framework of all-
European security arrangements. With 
these essentials, Mr. President, I ex-
pressed substantial agrel"menl In my re-
marks of February 12. although I may 
differ In particulars wilh respect to ~he 
way they are being presently pursued. 
D ..... ERI:NC£S WlTH O .... IClAL POLlCY 
The basic points at which I diverge 
from what Is present offiCial policy, I be-
I!eve. are these: 
First. Ornclal paI!CY, In eITect. says that 
the RUSSians cannot leave Berlin or the 
routes of access to the city from the 
West; certainly, that they cannot leave 
in spirit and, perhaps, not even In body. 
For my part, r would have no particular 
desire to see them stay. in body or In 
spirit, even If they could be persuaded 
from gOing, which r doubt. 
second. Omclal pol!cy does not seek 
actively to try to bring about a unifica-
tion of the municipal services and gov-
ernment of the two Berllns at the present 
time. r believe that effort should be 
made. 
Third. OtTIcial poBcy does not seek to 
enlist the United Nations in the Berlin 
crisis at this time. For my part, I be-
lieve it is high time that this be done; 
particularly, that ~he conciliatory serv-
Ices of the secretary General be sought. 
Fourth. Omclal policy gives no evi-
dence of conslderlng replacing the 
thousands of Allied forces In Berlin with 
West Germans. lr we are not going to 
move or canno~ move In the direction 
of trying to bring about thc unity and 
Interim ncutralization of all Berlin 
through U.N. conc!JIation. then, I belleve, 
for the reasops I have already stated. we 
must give serious consideration to 
maktng this replacement. 
CONt"l-UDlNo COMMENTS 
FInally, Mr. President. I must bring to 
the attention of the Senate the testi-
mQny of General Maxwell D. Taylor. the 
Chief of StnfT of the Anny before the 
Senate Disarmament Subcommittee on 
February 2, testimony which was re-
leased only last weekend. The General 
said, In effect. that there must be total 
mobil!zatlon of this Nation It we are to 
resist force In Berlin. I must ask: What 
is being done to bring about this total 
mobllizatJon. or are we to assume that 
It will not be necessary? 
I hope deeply. Mr. PreSident. that 
force will not be brought Into play at 
Berlin but there J.s no certain promise in 
present circumstances that it will not be. 
I reiterate my bellet that It there Is to 
be a chance to avoid Its usc. "a. Westem 
initia.tlve fOr peace J.s essential." 
The points which I raised In my re-
marks on February 12 were designed to 
Indicate a POSSible direction for that Ini_ 
tiative. 
Of equal Importance with the desire 
for peace. Mr. PreSident. Is the energy 
and torbearance with which thla Gov-
ernment pursues thl5 great need and 
desire of mankind. Of greatest Impor_ 
tance is a national leadership which acts 
positively for peace. 
H the PreSident leads In that fashion. 
he will find the people of this Nation 
and the people of the Cree world wlll 
be solidly behind him . 
Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President. 
will the Senator yield? 
lI-lr. MANSFIELD. I yield. 
Mr~ FULBRIGHT. I should like to 
take this opportw\!ly to eXPl'ess my ap-
preciation. and I know tilc appreciation 
of tile Senate, for ~he very (Inc Job the 
senator from Montana has clone In 
bringing this qUestion belore this body 
and the country. and In developing It 
in such a logical and effective way. as 
he did today and a.s hc did on the pre-
vious occasion. 1 regret very much that 
lllness prevent.ed me from being here on 
the occasion of the previous sl>Cech on 
this subject by the 6enat.or from Mon-
tana. The senat.or has already Inspired 
a great deal of very fruitful discussion 
of this issue. and I think the COWltry 
and the senate will benefit lmmeasur-
ably from the etrort3 of the 6enat.or from 
Montana. I wish t.o Join all the other 
Senators who have complimented thc 
Senator from Montana. for his efforts. 
which have contributed so much t.o bet-
ter Wlderstandlng of this problem. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the dis -
tinguished chairman of the COmmittee 
on Foreign Relations. I recall to the 
senator's memory that ..... e came to the 
Congress together in 1943, and since 
that time we have had a fairly elose re-
lationship In the foreign policy field. Of 
course I am Indebted to the Senator 
from Arkansas, ~he chairman ot the 
Committee on Foreign Relations. for 
his kind words. for hIs unfaillng under. 
standing, and tor hls tolerRnce Rncl 
streqgth over th-e years gone by. 
Mr. PreSident, I now wish to turn t.o 
another subject. 
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 
Senator from Montana has the floor. 
FebruaTY :26 
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And even It we cannot, what shall we 
have sacrificed by tr:yLng? 
Polnt.:s" and 5: Unless a unified, neu-
traHzed Berlin under Unlted Nations' 
auspices Is established as an Interim 
measure, then Western forces must re_ 
main in Berlin, regardless of whether 
the Russians leave, It Is time to think 
seriousLy, however, of repLacing as 
rapidly as possibLe the thousands of non-
Gel"man allied mUllan' personnel in Ber-
line with West German mll!tJa. 
Here. £\.gain, Mr. President, I find In 
present policy nothing comparable to this 
suggestion, Present policy. saYll. in 
eflect. that the Russians must stay In 
BerBn-ln spirit, It not In bedy. Apart 
from the fact that I see no practicable 
way t.o make them stay in either body or 
spirit it they wish to go, I am moot re-
luctant to go along with a policy that 
seeks to require the RUSSians to stay any-
where westward, It tliey propose to take 
even a few st.eps backward~astward. 
I am fully aware that their soinG may 
complicate our remaining In S erlin. We 
shall be face to face. then. with East Ger-
mans. They wl!l be Communists, to be 
sure-but. nevertheless. Germans, not 
Russians. Th:;: AlUed forccs may well be 
compelled, in th4 latt anal,ysls, to face 
them. !l we mean to stay in Berlin at all 
costs. 
It was an awareness of this probability, 
Mr. President, which prompt.ed me to 
suggest that It Is time to th ink serlousiy 
of replacing the thousands of allled ml.l1-
tary personnel In We~t BerUn wh.h West 
German militia. If there Is to be a loss of 
life among East Germans, In order to 
preserve what Is. In the last ar.alyslS. a 
West German position e ... en more than 
an allied position In Berlin. then it seems 
to me best that the alHed forces move 
as quickly 8.5 po.ssible to the re~erve. e ... en 
as the Russmns intend to do on the other 
side. This Is not a matler ot "pas~lng 
the buck." It is a matter of reeognizinS 
that among Germans. as among others. 
blood may wetl pro ... e thicker than Ideol-
ogies. 
It will be a tras edy if men must die in 
this situation In any event. It will hurt 
the cause of freedom In Germany e ... en 
more. howe ... er, if th!! Germans who may 
lose their lives in a limited connlct tor 
access to Berlin lose them by the action 
of foreign forces. 
I know. Mr. President. that there are 
gra ... e risks In using West German forces 
In thts fashion. Once InJccted Into the 
Situation at Berlln. It Is dimcult to fore-
see the contingencies which may subse-
Quently arise. That Is why I said 'It Is 
time to think seriously of using them. not 
that It Is time to use them. The risks 
must be weighed In the Ught ot all the 
Infot'mation and estimates available to 
the El(eeuU ... e. They must be weighed 
against the countless risks or trying to 
preserve. with Allied forces, a statu~ QUO 
In a Situation which wJ!] change. Inevi_ 
tably. once the Russlans ha ... e left Bef-
lin. There may be sound reasons tor 
not taking this cour~e of substituting 
West Germans for the Allied torces at 
West Serlin. There are no sound rea-
SOIlS. howe ... er, for not el(ploring tully 
Its implications within our own Govern-
NO. 32-10 
ment and with Allied governments, or 
tor tailing to do so promptly. 
Point 6: There must be a great deal 
ot talk between Germans who are in 
authority in the Federal Republic and 
Germans who purport to be in authority 
in the Eastern zone. 
This III the point, Mr. President, of 
which much has been made In com· 
"ments on my remarks of February U. 
n seems to me that a monumental Issue 
has been generat.ed here. although, In 
fact. no substantial Issue exists. 
The administration-the Western al· 
lies-have proposed talks with the Rus· 
slans, at which each 6.lde misht ha ... e 
German observers. In other words. East 
Germans and West Germans are both to 
be admltt.ed to these talks on Germany, 
it the Russians aceept the We~tern pro--
_I. 
Now. Mr. PreSident, does anyone be-
lieve that in talks on the German prob-
lem, these Germans-East and WClS~ 
Germans-are going to do nothing but 
observe? No. Mr. President; they are 
obviously going to talk, the West Ger. 
mans through the allied natiOnli. the East 
Germans through the Soviet Union. It 
there Is a dilTerence between official pol_ 
icy and what I sUBge~ted In thl~ respect. 
It Is certainly a minor one. It I may 
draw an analogy, perhaps I can make the 
dllTerence clear. I sUsgested, In effect, 
that the Germans-East and' West-e"o 
oft Into another room and try to come 
up with concrete proPQlials on the PJ"ob-
iem ot German unJfication. whiCh they 
would then lay before the al1!ed powers 
and the Soviet Union, for approval and 
for guarantee. 
Many ot those who ha ... e commented 
on this proposal have said In effect: 
··No. That Is a dangeroU$ procedure." 
'I1ley have said-those who endorse pres-
ent offiCial policy on this pOint-that 
the West Germans must whisper In the 
ear of the aUles what they think should 
be done about unification and the East 
Germans mu~t whisper In the ear of the 
SOviet UnJon. 'I1lell, the Western allies 
and the So ... let Union " 'Ill add their own 
thoughts and try, out of the COIliIOmera. 
lion. to reach an agreement. 
Mr. President, either way Is agreeable 
to me. Out ot my own limited experl· 
ence at International conterences. how-
e ... er, I ha ... e my own views as to Which 
way Is likely to offer Sreater prospect tor 
success. Those who now conduct forei gn 
POllcy ha ... e theirs. I am more than will· 
Ing to try their way !l they believe It will 
work. I ha ... e a feeling, however. that 
bet ore we are done with this matter of 
whispering In ears and the friction of no 
contact between the Germans. we shall 
be more than wlll ins to try others. 
Point 7: All-German elections may not 
be essential to peace and to freedom. but 
there must be some opportunity for the 
people of East Germany. as there Is In 
West Germany. to express their p;)llt~cal 
preferences and to partiCipate In politi-
cal atralrs Without terror. Unless there 
Is, the search tor peace can lead to the 
jeopardizing or freedom. 
Here again, Mr. Pre~ldent. I do not 
belie ... e there Is a basic dltrerence be· 
tween the prescnt policies of this Gov. 
ernment and the view which I stated. 
The Secretary of State made clear. long 
betore my ~peech of February 12" that 
aU-German elections need not be essen-
tial 8.5 a first step In German unifica-
tion. I do not know at what stage they 
would become CSSCllltlal, nor, l\'lth aU 
due respect, do I belIeve anyone else does 
a~ this time. 
The Secretary has recognized that re-
ality. and I applaud his recognition ot 
It. I say further. however, that unlcss 
the hand of polItical terror begins to 
lift In East Germany there Is a danger 
to freedom In any form of unification 
which may be tried. While this point 
has not been el(pllcltly stated by the Sec-
retary, I am sure that those who are 
responsible for the conduct of foreign 
policy are not unaware of It. 
Point 8: 'I1le Western allies and the 
Soviet Union must guarantee for a pe. 
rlod of time the unified Germany which 
may emerge from dlscuss10ns among the 
Germans. They must see to It that 
Germany IS neither subjected to mili_ 
tary pressures from Its 'neighbors nor 
becomes a source of milltary pressures 
to Its neighbors. 
Again, Mr. President, there Is no dis· 
agreement on this obvious point. It has 
long been a part of the polley ot this 
Government to recognize that a peace 
treaty for ~rmany, which provides for 
the reasonable security needs of Ita 
nelghboI1l, Ineludilli the SOviet Union, 
Is an essential of peace. One may differ 
with the way this objective has been 
pursued. but there are few dilferenees 
a.s to Its essentialIty. 
Point 9: It Is essential that our policy, 
NATO's polICies, do not eXelude a care-
ful consideration-may I repeat that 
word, "conslderatlon"---<lf the Rapackl 
plan, the Edcll pi"", for .. ucm!lll, ... ,·il<t:d 
zone In middle Europe. or Similar pro· 
posals In connection with the unlflca· 
tlon of Germany, predicated-may I 
repeat that word, "predlcated"---<lr con· 
tingent upon the outcome of the con· 
ferences on surprise attack, and ~uspen· 
slon of nuelear tests now going on in 
Geneva. 
The Western Powers have indicated 
an Interest in negotiating a European 
security pact. We are now seeking an 
agreement. at Geneva. on the problem of 
nuclear testing and the prevention of 
surprise attack. 
Further, I am gtven to understand 
that It Is the polley of this dovernment 
to recognize that agreement Is possl. 
ble to exclude missile bases' from all 
German soiL Similarly. that It Is pos. 
~ible to thin out foreign forces In West 
Germany in return for a thinning out 
ot SOviet for~es In East Germany. 
If that Is the case, Mr. President, 
there IS no basic incompatibility between 
the essentials that I listed and what 
official poliCY I~ prepared_I repeat that 
word. "prepared"-to do. The obJec· 
U ... e is the same. I reser ... e the rJght, 
howe ... er, to examine subsequently the 
way we are going about trying to 
reach It. 
8.lMILiI.rrns IIrrwEEN OITICL\L POLler "ND 
NUU: POINTS 
The differences between what we are 
dOing, as a matter ot omclal policy, and 
what I suggested as the essentlal5 of a. 
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and because of hil; grea~ capnclty, h is 
great knowledge. his great abmty. and 
the leadership which he hl\.S displayed, 
imotllI' as the Ber!!n and German sltUII.4 
tlons are concetnoo, he Is In avery large 
sense indispenSllble. 
I hope that any conferences covering 
these two qucstloru;.-becnuse they arc 
Interrelated-will be held In Washing_ 
ton, where we can make use of Mr. 
Dulles' capa.eltles and abilities, to advise 
and lead the West. 
In the la.st analysis, whether his health 
will permit him to make that contribu-
tion Is for the President. the Secrel.4ry. 
and his doctors to decide, as the Presi-
dent so cogently pointed out In his press 
conference of Febcullry 25, 1959. 
Let me emphlUllu, however. that be-
cause Mr. Dulles Is III Is no reason for 
deelarlna a moraklrium on a frank and 
full discussion of the Nation's pollclcs 
1n the light. of the critical sltuaUon in 
Germany. It 1 know Mr. Dulles at all , 
he ~'ould be the ftrst to recoanlze Ule 
need for this discussion to continue. He 
would be the first to denounce any 
ghoulish political proftteerlng on hls III· 
nes In order to silence this discussion. 
There are those who have expressed 
confusion as to how I can support Mr. 
Dulles' continuance in oroce and stili 
criticl!;C some of thc policies executed 
under his name. I can only say that It 
is not the ftn;t time. and I hope It Is 
not the last. We shall have reached a 
very low point. Indeed, In the practice 
of free and responsible government when 
a Senator has no choice but to agree 
100 percent with IL secretary of State 
or to hang him in emIlY. 
I Intended to gO on '" I have in thla 
matter, I shall endorse the forelin 
policies of this administration when I 
belle\'e they are sound policies. I shall 
try to contribute constructively to their 
reshaping when I believe that they are 
not.--I repeat the word "constructively." 
because 1 have alwass tried to operate 
constructively. That!.s a position. Mr. 
President. which I have maintained since 
I entered thls body. and also during the 
10 year prior thereto when I served as a 
member of the Committee on f\)relgn 
Mairs of the House of Representatives. 
It Is the position I propose to m:Llntaln so 
long as I am In the Senate. I shall 
maintain It resardless of the party which 
!.s responsible for the administration or 
the Natlon's aJTalrs. 
I,rnTtnlt': ON .... XHlItrallCRO:V 
Further. I Propose to say what I 
have to say when I have to say It, irre· 
speetlve ot Mr. Khrushchev's threal$ or 
blandlshmenl$. It is. to me, a matter 
of lndUrerence whether Mr. Khrushchev 
agrees or dlSRirees with me. I hope this 
Government. Mr. President. will never, 
out ot a timorous feeling that Mr. Khru-
shchev may disapprove. tail to stand for 
what It must stand for. EqualLy. Mr. 
President, I hope that thls Oovernment 
will never tail to act a.s it must act out or 
an even more timorous reeling that Mr. 
Khrushchev may approve. What I said 
on thls point on February 12 I believe 
bears repeatllli'. I said then, and. I say 
again today: 
It we are to be prepared to lace this crlsl. 
In Germany. I~ 'IIIll be best not to beCOme 
dl.trBCted Or oba_a by the tW\lta and turn. 
of SoViet behavior, The rUndamen!.a1 qun_ 
uon or ponc,. for us I. not ao much what 
th" Ru .. lanl .r" lookLng for In Oerman,.. 
We know what t.hey ..... e lookIng tor "na they 
may .-try ... ell seLze It whU" ... e "mu .. or 
ftl8CLnlll" our,el"",," by t'1'lni to ln~rprct 
the charades Of Rua.IBn beh"Vlor, 
No, Mr. President. It Is more important 
to us. far more Important, to kno ..... \!o'hat 
we ouuelves are seeking In Germany. 
We must bring to this crisis not only 
courage, but also conviction. We must 
bring to It a positive and undent.andable 
policy which meets our essential national 
needs lUld the essentlal needs of freed om, 
and. If possible. meets them In peace. 
It ..... as that thought. Mr. President. 
which prompted me to list nine points for 
exploration In a search for a POSIUve 
policy on Oennany last February 12. 
Some of these points \!o'ere then. or at 
least have alnce become, a part of the 
present omclal polley of the United. 
State:!. Others are not a part ot that 
policy. They represent what. to me, 
seem rational approaches to varioua 
aspecl$ of the problem of Oermany, In 
great meMure. they are not original ex-
cept In their restntement, as my Inserts 
In the COti'CllUSTOlolAt RtOO1l0 of Febru-
ary 16. 1959. will show. But tor their re-
~tatement In the context of the speech. 
I wish to make It clear that I claim full 
respanslblllty. 
acc.o.~JTVt.ATTOlol or THE ,..t,..E r<l1NT8 
Mr. President, I should no ..... like to 
review the nine points and to discuss 
their status In omclal policy lit the pres-
ent time. as w('11 as certain ot the com -
menl$ whiCh have been ma!!e upon them. 
On February t2 T "!lId' 
I can be ... tOnl. and IIUlnd rtldy to flUfpt 
a better U!umln.tlon of the probLem throuil:h 
dlleuulon ana debue In Ule SeIlBt.e. 
I say that again. I may add. however. 
that little which has since transpired or 
has since been said prompts me to 
modify these points In any sl&nlflcant 
degree. 
Point 1: There must be no retreat of 
the forces Of freedom a~ Berlin. Mr. 
President. J said that. not once. but at 
ieMt six times during the coursc of my 
remarks on Ecbruary 12. Weeks before 
that date. I had publicly endor$ed.. a draft 
Senate resolution which would hln'e up-
held the posilion of the administration to 
stand fast. That. 1 may add. Is the only 
resolution on the oennan situation 
whiCh I have endor$ed.. &0 far, 
So far lIS I know. there hM not been 
IUly slgnlftcant dlfl'erence nmon& Demo-
crats and Republicans. or between the 
senate and the excutlve branch ot the 
Government. on the need to stand fast 
at Berlin. Certainly there never has 
been on my part. 
Point Z: The Germ:'!. n leaders of the 
two BerUn communities should be urged 
to be&ln 5CrlOUS elloN to unify the pub-
lic serviCe:! and munlclpnl (!:O\'ernment or 
that city. I know. Mr. PreSident. that 
there are those who will say this ap-
proach Is illusory IUld unrealistic; that 
the East Germall.'l cannot be expected to 
agree even on a common sewage system, 
let alone on a common municipal &overn-
memo I ,,"'ould point out In reply. how· 
ever, that it Berlln does not have a com-
mon ~e~'age system. It does have a com-
mon subway system. If the German 
leader ot East and West Berlin can 
a&ree on that. M they have. is It beyond 
the realm of the possible that they may 
Rllrec on other common publiC services, 
particularly If they mean to have peace; 
or that they may reaCh a series of agree· 
ments which might ultimately lead to a. 
single municipal government for the 
city? I must Mk: What stands In the 
way of an Initiative of this kind? What 
wlll be lost by trylng to bring o.bout thls 
proGress toward municipal unity In Ber_ 
lin? If we mean to have peace. I be· 
lIeve the effort should be made. It~hould 
be made not only to ease the danger of 
war at this most critical point In Ger-
many; It should be made. too. because 
If It Is 8ucce:dul, out of the microcosm 
of Bf'rlln could emerge patterns of unifi-
cation for aU ot Germo.ny. 
BerUn. of course. Is an aspeet of the 
whole problem of German unification but 
it is aiso the mOISt preslu",c and compel-
ling aspect. It Is at Berlin and along 
the routes of access to that city that the 
danll'er of connlct Is greaten. In that 
sense It requlnos the most Immediate at· 
tentlon. ('ven It solution to its problem 
of unlflclltlon may be merely by means 
of Interim solutions. pendmi the out-
come of the whole problem or German 
unification. So tar M I kno\\'. Mr. Presi-
dent. at pre5ent we are d.olng nothing. 
In an om '10.1 sense. to bring about an at-
tempt at munltlpaJ unity In B<-rlln. 
Point 3: The conciliatory un'LCf'.! of 
the United. Nations and. particularly. ot 
il$ Secret:'!.ry Genenal. should be enll.l.le<i, 
to try to de\-elop an ali-Berlin gOHrn-
ment. H lueh I\. ao\'crnment does 
emel'Re In Lhe mun.icipallty, then a 
United Nallons emer~ency foree Should 
replace both Commun4t and AWed 
forces In malntatng free access to the 
city from all dIrections. pendml' a Ken· 
erol settlement ot ~he German problem, 
So far as I know, Mr. President. 110 
omclal steP3 ho.ve been tak('n In this 
dh'CCUon, Thele are hlnls. Mr. Presl· 
dent. that If trouble does de\"~lop at Ber-
Un. then the matter will be taken to Ule 
UnlU!d. Nations. 1 would deem it a wel-
come chllll(le. Mr. President. tor once to 
brln.g the United Natloru; Into nn Inter-
natiOlUl1 punle before. not alter. the 
pieces ho.ve IJ.e.cn hopelessly scattered. 
Those In the Senate who sa"'" nt to 
comment on m:my parts of my last 
statement gcnerally refmlned from com-
ment on this point. I am not prepared 
to conclude. howe\·er. that In Gel·many 
at this time there is no possible con-
st.ructi\'e role for the United Nations 
and. the Secretary General. I beUel'e 
that there Is somethin't' to be 5.'1ld for an 
attempt to bring the United Nations Into 
the situation. now. In the role of nre· 
prevention. not mel'ely laler. In the role 
of flrefl<:htlng. For my part 1 would 
much prefer to sec the whole city of 
Berlin neull'fllized on an Interim basIS. 
under United Nations auspices. 11 that 
can be obtained. rather than to have 
E:l.'it Getman agenl$ of the Soviet Union 
stamping the pennll$ of western allll"d 
transports to West Berlin. We can not 
know whether such an arrnngement cnn 
be obtained. wlUI we try to obtain it... 
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Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President. I, 
too. wish to speaK on the OClman ques-
tion. I nm $Orry that I did not complete 
the pN!paratJon of my speech In time to 
give copies to my colleniues, to the om-
clal Reportel"S, or to the pre~s. 
I am rrntdul to the Senator from 
Conneelicut for showlns- me and others 
of his colleaiu('&-If not all Of them_the 
courtesy of sendlnlj: to us coplcs of the 
magnltlcent speeeh which he hu just 
completc<t. I commcnd hIm most highly, 
because I thInk he has made a N!al con-
tribution to the public undcrstandlng of 
this mO$t Important problem 1 believe 
that In emphas./:r.lng the dlmcultles which 
will face our country and the free ~:orld 
on or before May 21. he hu rendcred II 
service which should be nppreclated by 
all. 
He minced no words In hI., ~P«'Ch. I 
Shall mince no words In mine. ....s a 
U.s. Senator from the Stnte of Mon-
tana. like the U.S Senlltor from the 
State of Connecticut or IIny other State. 
I have a duty and a re6poUSlbUity to call 
my 6hou 8$ I sec them, to let the cards 
fall where they may. 
So with this npolotn' to my cclleagues. 
the Officla] Reporters of Debates. and 
the Pl·ess for not having a prcpared copy 
of my speech. lind with my public com-
mendaUon and congratulations to the 
dlstlngulshcd Senator from Connecticut 
for making an exccllent speech and lay_ 
Ing It on the line. I wlsl1 to ~lI y thanks 
because he hos rendered a public service. 
I hope other Senatou. In addition to·the 
Senator from Connccticut lind the Sen_ 
ator from New York. will likewise t.l\ke 
the floor and try to let thc people of this 
country !\nd the world know ju~t what 
the .... meriean pOsition Is. and to empha_ 
siw that, regardless of any dltferenC6$ 
as to how wc Shall achieve our objective, 
there arc no dltferences.so Car as our de_ 
sire and our detcrmlnaUon to remaln 
In W('$t Berlin are concerned. 
SOme days IIgo. I discussed In the 
Senate the coming crlsb In Germany. 
Other Mcmbera have since contrlbutc<t 
to the dl$Custlon of this crltlca] matter. 
That Is all to thc good. I am persuaded 
thllt out of this turmoil of thought will 
comc a tll·m and POSltI\·., polley. a policy 
Which. cI'en If It does not yield a rapid 
resolution of the OerUlan sltuaLlon, wlll 
at least unite and steel the Nation for 
the dangerous days which lie ahead. 
Let there be no mistake about what 
does lie ahead. Thl.s I.s no diplomatic 
lark on which the world I.s about to em-
bark at Berlin. This 15 no chlld·s play 
of blind man's buff. 
When I addressed the senate on lileb-
l1,Iary 12. Mr. PresIdent. I made a dele-
tion from my remarQ Just a lew mo-
menu before I dellvered them. I did so 
because I did not wish to be undulY 
alarmist. Now the same thought ha.s 
been expressed by the Prime Minister of 
the United Kingdom. ltha.s becn recoil-
nlted by Members of this body such as 
the distinguished Senator from Ken-
tucky (Mr. Cool'uJ and Increasingly by 
the press. It Is at least beginning to 
sin ll: home that the world Is entering 
into a situation In Germany III which. 
the lives of tens of mlllLons of people-
Americans Included-may well balance 
on the avoidance of a single significant 
error. 
The British Prime Minister warned, 
the other day. of a suicidal war by "mls-
calcu]atlon:' As the distinguished Sen-
ator from Kentucky [Mr. MORTON). a 
former Assistant Secretary of State. has 
sRld th.ls afternoon. the Brltlsh Prime 
Minister also used the word "muddling:' 
I can say now with greater aasurance 
what I Intended to say but deleted from 
my remarks on February 12: '·1 e:oo;press 
to the Senate my belief that Just ahead 
lies a period which may ,,:ell see the 
Nation and the rest of the world miss a 
deva.statJng war by a very narrow mar-
gin. Indeed. It Is a period which may 
see us In ",'ar. IImltc<t war or unlimited 
war, ""ar by accident or war by de-
sign. ",·ar by childish IItubbornness or 
bravadO." 
"><1: uSI'O .. Sf1l.LTTT op u ..... TOII.. n. TI.I: 
If that Is the case. Mr. President. what 
are the Members of this body to do? 
Are they to guard their sUence when 
conscience compels them to speak? .... re 
they to Ignore their reSPOllSlblllUes to 
their SUltes and our country as they see 
tho$e responslbUltJes? Are they to ac-
cept as ali-pervasive the undoubted 
wisdom of the PrC5lden~ and lhe cxeeu-
Uve branch of the Government? Or 
are they to think for themselves and 
speak for themselves? 
Are they to be more concerned with 
how words wi!! sound nbroad, and so hold 
their peace? Or must t.hey. even mON!, 
seek to dispel any uncertaInties of the 
people of the Nation as to the course 
whIch thIs Government l$ pursuing. and 
to seek to do $0 by examining the Issues 
which underlie that course? Are they 
to walt until they hear what the Depart-
ment of SUlte has to say on the matter 
and then parrot agreement? Are they 
to walt to hear what Mr. Khrushchev 
has to say, .so that they may be /lure 
that what they su"b$equenUy say will be 
In disagreement? 
I do not know what others may con-
tend In this matter. I can speak only 
for myself. For myself . Mr. PreSident, 
I can say only that when conscience 
compels me to speak, l owe It to the 
people of my State and our country to 
/lpeall: out. Por myself, Mr. President, 
I hold that the moot important matter 
Js not how people abroad may Interpret 
my words. Important as that may be. 
It ls more Important that the people of 
my State and our country understand 
fully what Is at stake In this llituatlon. 
More Important Is the need 01 the ~ 
pie of the United St.I\tes to be satJsfl.ed 
that the course to which they are com_ 
mittee! by their Government ls a sound 
one. II they are, to be asked to give their 
IIveJ, as weU they may be, then the course 
of thls Government must represent the 
outgrowth of pOlicies whiCh refteet the 
deepest needs of tile people of the United 
Statel. They must be pollclCll which are. 
In lact, the best that can be devised by 
thls Government to safeguard the N&._ 
lion and freedom. and to do so, It ))03 -
/Slb]e. In pellce. 
Mr. PresIdent. to those who say we 
may upset people abrood by our discus-
SIOllS, I clln only reply that we do not 
fool anyone abroad If we fool our~elveJ 
at home. The unity of the slogan may 
well be no unity at all. It may well be 
merely the facade of unity: the Com-
munist. the totalitarian concept of unity. 
The unity of free man needs to rest 
on ftrmer ground. For the grim days 
which lie ahead In Oermany, this Nation 
neel1s the unity which can come only 
from an understanding of where we 
stand. ",'here It ls we are headed. and why. 
To $tand last In Oermany. as Indeed we 
must, we need to think carefully, to think 
deeply. and we need to do It now. We 
need to speak out seriously. soberly, and 
we need to do It now. TIle time to ex-
amine pollclcs Is before. not after, their 
coruequences are upon us. I emphasize 
that point-before, not after-as In 
Korea a few years ago. 
POfIIT.Off Off ..... I>l1U.d 
Mr. PreSident. I yield to no one In my 
appreelation of the enormous burdens of 
the secretary of State and his Depart-
ment. charged. as they are, with primary 
responSibility, under the PreSident. for 
the Nation's policies. I believe the 
reeord of my position In thIs matter Is 
very clear. I regard Mr. Dulles, as I 
have since I have known him. as an able 
and a dedicated Civil servant. I have 
endorsed many of the policies which ha\·e 
been pursued since he took otnce. I have 
worked with him closely, very closely. on 
several of these matters. I have never 
felt. however, that this con~tralned upOn 
me a silence when I dl$(l,greed: nor. I am 
sure. did he. I favor the continuance of 
Mr. Dulles In omce now. not out of any 
sentimentality. but because I believe that 
If his health permits, Mr. Dulles Is capa._ 
ble of making an extremely slgnlftcant 
contribution to the security of the Nation 
find to the search for peace. particularly 
at this time. 
I do not believe In the concept of the 
Indlspensab]e man. However, I do be-
lieve that there are times ",·hen a man 
may become Virtually Indlspensab]e. 
Because of what Mr. Dulles has done over 
the past several months, espeelaUy dur-
Ing the past several weeks. In going to 
Weslern Europe and d!$Cusslng the Ber_ 
lin and ~l"man matters with our allies, 
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